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CONSIGNING WOMEN TO THE IMMEDIATE ORBIT OF A MAN: 
HOW MISSOURI’S RELOCATION LAW SUBSTITUTES JUDICIAL 
PATERNALISM FOR PARENTAL JUDGMENT BY FORCING 
PARENTS TO LIVE NEAR ONE ANOTHER1 
INTRODUCTION 
Shelly Osia had a simple request—she wanted to move with her children to 
a new residence thirty-two miles away.2  Shelly and her husband had been 
divorced for less than a year, and Shelly found it difficult to adjust to post-
divorce life in her current residence.3  She had a long commute to work, 
traveling over fifty miles from her rural Missouri residence to her job in Saint 
Louis.4  Her three children had various health problems:5 one child had rather 
significant allergies and skin problems6 and another child had ADHD, which 
resulted in problems focusing at school and completing homework.7  The 
children’s doctor was in St. Louis, and when the children had last minute 
health problems, Shelly would drive almost 200 miles from her job in St. Louis 
to pick up the children at school, take them to the doctor, return them home, 
and then drive back to her work.8  Her ex-husband rarely assisted in these 
doctor visits.9  These doctor visits were so common that Shelly reserved her 
vacation leave days for them.10  The lengthy commute to work prevented 
Shelly from being able to prepare breakfast for the children and help them get 
ready for school.  The children’s grandmother helped them get ready for school 
each morning, but she was getting older and it was becoming increasingly 
 
 1. The title makes reference to Helentjaris v. Sudano, 476 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1984) (explaining that relocation restrictions that trap women in a geographic location 
where the only people who know her are those who know her as a couple with her husband are 
“consigning [her] for the next decade and a half to the immediate orbit of a man to whom she was 
briefly and unhappily married, to what is for her an alien environment in which she has neither 
family nor professional ties”).  
 2. Appellant’s Brief at 5, Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 3. Id. at 5. 
 4. Id. at 6. 
 5. Id. at 6–8. 
 6. Id. at 7–8. 
 7. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 6–9. 
 8. Id. at 8. 
 9. Id. at 11. 
 10. Id. at 8. 
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difficult for her to be able help.11  The long commute also prevented Shelly 
from arriving home much earlier than 6:00 p.m., which left her little time to 
help with the children’s nightly homework.12 
The children’s school district did little to ease Shelly’s stress.  Because of a 
shortage of staff and students, multiple grade levels were combined into one 
classroom,13 and two of her children persistently struggled with their grades.14  
Her son with ADHD had such a hard time concentrating that his tests had to be 
read aloud.15  The school psychologist recommended that the child receive 
individual tutoring or Title I instruction, but the school had few resources 
outside of the classroom, and Shelly had to argue with the school to get her son 
the individual instruction he needed.16 
Shelly decided to move to another town so that the children would be able 
to attend a school better equipped for their needs and to shorten her own work 
commute.17  In compliance with Missouri’s statute regarding relocation, she 
sent a letter to her ex-husband notifying him that she planned to move with the 
boys in seventy-six days.18  To show her good faith in seeking to relocate, she 
offered to provide half of the transportation19 and pay for the increased tuition 
and child care costs.20  Her letter explained that her reasons for moving were to 
“improve the children’s education, to allow her to attend more school 
activities, and so that the children would be closer to their doctor’s office.”21 
Shelly had already purchased a new home in the town where she wished to 
live.22  In anticipation of relocation, she offered her current residence for sale, 
which sold before her case made it to trial.23  As a result, she and her sons 
temporarily had to move in with her mother nearby while she awaited the 
relocation trial and her subsequent appeal.24 
 
 11. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 8. 
 12. Id. at 8–9. 
 13. Id. at 6. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 7. 
 16. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
 17. Id. at 9. 
 18. Id.; Appellant’s Brief exhibit 2 at A18, Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2008) (letter from Shelly Osia to Raymond Osia (Mar. 16, 2007) (on file with author)) 
[hereinafter Letter from Shelly Osia]. 
 19. The children’s father had previously been providing all of the transportation.  
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 9; Letter from Shelly Osia, supra note 18. 
 20. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 10. 
 21. Id.; Letter from Shelly Osia, supra note 18. 
 22. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 9; Letter from Shelly Osia, supra note 18. 
 23. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 10. 
 24. Id.  
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Shelly’s ex-husband opposed the relocation for two reasons.25  First, he 
complained that the increased distance would add twenty minutes driving time 
to each visitation,26despite Shelly having offered to allow him to pick up the 
children earlier, which would have given him more overall time with the 
children.27  Second, he wanted the children to remain in the school that they 
had been struggling in so they could continue to play on their sports teams.28 
The trial court denied Shelly’s relocation request.29  She appealed to the 
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, which affirmed the trial 
court’s opinion with a mere memorandum opinion,30 the type of opinion the 
court issues when it believes that the facts and law in the case would add 
nothing helpful to a body of law.31 
Shelly Osia is merely one example of a parent who has been harmed by 
Missouri’s restrictive relocation law.  Relocations are becoming increasingly 
prevalent in today’s society and relocation law concerns continue to perplex 
scholars and courts.32  Commentators have remarked that relocation issues are 
“one of the most important topics currently affecting domestic relations law.”33 
Parents move for career opportunities, educational opportunities, family 
proximity, marriage, and changing neighborhood preferences.34  In today’s 
modern society, changing residences is a common occurrence—on average, 
families move once every seven years.35  Divorced families are generally more 
likely to relocate than intact families.36  Seventy-five percent of divorced 
 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 11. 
 29. Judgment at A2, Osia v. Osia, No. 05WA-CC00096-01 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 24th Cir. Jul. 23, 
2007). 
 30. Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam). 
 31. MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.16(b), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHand 
booksP2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/e43a2575286b55ef86256ca600521
5d2?OpenDocument. 
 32. Lucy S. McGough, Starting Over: The Heuristics of Family Relocation Decision 
Making, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291, 293 (2003) (noting that the issue has been a feminist and 
father’s rights issue, has piqued the attention of social scientists, and inspired conferences, 
symposia, and international surveys). 
 33. Jill S. Kingsbury, “Mommy, Are We Moving?  No . . . Maybe . . . Yes . . . .”—The 
Evolution of Missouri’s Relocation Law, 60 J. MO. B. 83, 83 (2004). 
 34. See Carol S. Bruch, Sound Research or Wishful Thinking in Child Custody Cases? 
Lessons From Relocation Law, 40 FAMILY L.Q. 281, 282 (2006). 
 35. Id.; see also Amie J. Tracia, Navigating the Waters of Massachusetts Child Relocation 
Law: Assessing the Application of the Real Advantage Standard, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. 
ADVOC. 139, 139 (2008) (stating that one-fifth of Americans change their residence each year). 
 36. Edward S. Snyder, Relocation Made Easier: In Baures, The Court Seems to Further 
Alleviate the Burden Applied to Custodial Parents Seeking to Relocate, 165 N.J. L.J. 930, 930 
(2001).  The most common family-related reason for relocation is change in marital status.  
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mothers will relocate “within four years after separation or divorce,” and half 
of those mothers will relocate again.37  This upsurge in mobility is attributed to 
increases in technological development, women in the workforce, remarriage, 
as well as an unstable and unpredictable employment market.38 
It is “unrealistic” to expect divorced or never-married parents to remain 
indefinitely in the same geographical area and, in most cases, it would be 
improper for courts to “exert pressure on them to do so.”39  In Missouri, 
however, like many other states, it is often very difficult for custodial parents 
to relocate with their children.40  Relocation is difficult even when the move is 
a short distance away, even if the parent’s motive for seeking to relocate is 
proper.41  While modern laws no longer allow husbands an explicit right to 
choose their wife’s domicile, in practice restrictive relocation laws perpetuate 
the outdated notion that consigns women and children to the immediate orbit 
of a man.42 
To be clear, this Comment uses the phrases “custodial parent,” “relocating 
parent,” and “mother” interchangeably.  It also uses “non-custodial parent,” 
“non-relocating parent,” and “father” interchangeably.  These terms are meant 
 
McGough, supra note 32, at 292.  “Three out of four custodial mothers move at least once within 
the four years immediately following a divorce.”  Id.  
 37. Sarah Gottfried, Virtual Visitation: The Wave of the Future in Communication Between 
Children and Non-Custodial Parents in Relocation Cases, 36 FAM. L.Q. 475, 476 (2002). 
 38. Theresa Glennon, Still Partners?  Examining the Consequences of Post-Dissolution 
Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 118 (2007); see Lance Cagle, Have Kids, Might Travel: The Need 
for a New Roadmap in Illinois Relocation Cases, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255, 264 (2005); Judith S. 
Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations 
in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305, 310 (1996). 
 39. Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and Custodial 
Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 246 (1996) (quoting In re Marriage 
of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 480–81 (Cal. 1996)); see also Michel v. Michel, 834 S.W.2d 773, 776 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting In re Marriage of Greene, 711 S.W.2d 557, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1986) (“In [a] highly mobile society, it is unrealistic to inflexibly confine a custodial parent to a 
fixed geographical area, if removal to another area for reasons such as change of employment, 
remarriage, etc., is consistent with the best interest of the minor children.”)). 
 40. The term “custodial parent” refers to the parent exercising the most amount of time with 
the child.  The parent who exercises visitation with the child is termed the “non-custodial parent” 
regardless of whether the custodial arrangement is actually a joint custody arrangement, or a sole 
custody arrangement with visitation rights.  These terms are used to recognize the time allocation 
between parents in joint custody situations and sole custody situations are often indistinguishable.  
See Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing With Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in a Mobile 
Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 791, 792 n. 3 (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE 
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN IN AMERICA  251 (1985)).   
 41. Although one Missouri family law scholar has argued that Missouri’s relocation law has 
progressed “to a policy that tends to favor relocation,” in practice, it is extremely difficult for a 
custodial parent to succeed in a contested relocation battle.  See Kingsbury, supra note 33, at 83. 
 42. Helentjaris v. Sudano, 476 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). 
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to highlight the gender bias inherent in relocation jurisprudence,43 and the 
reality that well over 80% of parents seeking court-ordered relocation are 
mothers.44  This terminology is consistent with the terminology used by other 
family law scholars.45  It is this author’s experience, that Missouri’s relocation 
law, much like the relocation laws of other states, applies primarily, if not 
exclusively, to mothers seeking to relocate.  In the author’s review of all 
published Missouri appellate opinions in relocation cases, the author was not 
able to find a single instance where Missouri’s relocation law was used to bar a 
father from relocating with his children. 
This Comment argues that Missouri’s approach to relocation is 
fundamentally flawed and “jeopardizes the stability of custodial 
arrangement[]” for the sake of the utopian idea that forcing parents to live in 
the same geographical area will create a “simulation of unity.”46  This 
Comment focuses specifically on Missouri’s relocation laws, but many of the 
problems discussed are not unique to Missouri; rather, they are part of a larger 
national problem.  The critique of the law and the suggestions for change 
discussed here may be applicable to any state seeking to improve their 
relocation laws.  Part I provides a general overview of child custody and 
relocation law in Missouri and discusses how courts decide relocation cases.  
Part II discusses the ongoing debate regarding the competing values of 
custodial parents and non-custodial parents in relocation disputes.  Part II 
incorporates sociological and psychological research showing the impact of 
relocation on children and parents.  Part III discusses the numerous problems 
with Missouri’s relocation law.  Finally, Part IV advocates for a change in 
Missouri’s relocation law and suggests a model that protects both the interest 
of the mother and the father in relocation cases while emphasizing the best 
interests of the child and encouraging judicial consistency in relocation 
decision-making. 
 
 43. See infra Part III.D.1. 
 44. See The Hon. W. Dennis Duggan, Rock-Paper-Scissors: Playing the Odds with the Law 
of Child Relocation, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 193, 198 (2007).   
 45. See, e.g., Alix Gravenstein Pastis, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Sex-
Based Discrimination?, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 419, 421 (1986); Bruch, supra note 34, at 
282, n.4.   
 46. Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 333 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Helentjaris, 476 A.2d at 
832); Laura Caviness Cocus, Comment, Louisiana’s Restrictive Relocation Laws: Jeopardizing 
Stability in Custodial Arrangements for the Sake of Geographical Proximity Between Divorced 
Parents, 53 LOY. L. REV. 79, 82 (2007). 
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I.  GENERAL OVERVIEW OF RELOCATION LAW 
A. Initial Custody Determination 
When parents divorce, or when a child is born to unmarried parents, courts 
make initial custody decisions regarding the child using a “best interests of the 
child” analysis.47  Courts may award joint custody to the parents or sole 
custody to one parent.48  Joint physical custody denotes a sharing of custodial 
time with the child between the two parental residences; but the amount of 
time sharing can vary greatly between individual joint custody orders.  One 
parent is typically designated at the primary residential custodian—that is, the 
parent with which the child resides for the majority of the time.  Courts also 
fashion parenting plans that create a visitation schedule between the parents 
and explain how costs and decisionmaking authority will be allocated.49  Once 
courts make an original determination of custody, changes to custody are made 
only when there are substantial changes in circumstances that require the court 
to modify the original decree.50  This principle is based on the child’s need to 
have a stable relationship with his or her parents as well as the advantages in 
reducing the child to conflict by discouraging frequent litigation between the 
parents.51 
B. Missouri’s Relocation Law 
After the initial custody determination, a custodial parent wishing to move 
must comply with Missouri’s relocation statute.52  Missouri’s relocation law 
only restricts moves made by the primary custodial parent.53  Because courts 
are constitutionally forbidden from prohibiting an adult’s right to travel,54 
 
 47. See MO. REV. STAT § 452.375 (2000). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 307; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 20 (1996). 
 52. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377 (2000). 
 53. Although nothing in Missouri’s relocation law specifically limits the law only to the 
primary custodial parent, a comparison of Missouri’s law with scholarly literature indicates that 
this is true for Missouri also.  Compare e.g., Pastis, supra note 45, at 419–20, and Bruch, supra 
note 34, at 283, with MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377 (2000).  
 54. See generally Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional 
Perspective, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 67–81 (1996).  Although no Missouri case has made 
such a statement, and Missouri’s relocation law, on its face, appears to apply equally to both 
parents, all the scholarly literature and many sister state appellate opinions have made clear that 
relocation statutes like Missouri’s prohibit only the custodial parent from moving.  In the author’s 
review of hundreds of Missouri relocation opinions, she did not discover a single case in which 
Missouri’s relocation statute was used to restrain the relocation of the noncustodial parent, 
typically a father. 
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restrictions on the custodial parent’s mobility are justified as only preventing 
the move of the child: in other words, the courts cannot prevent the primary 
custodian from moving, but they can prevent her from moving with the child.55 
In contrast, courts do not prevent noncustodial parents from relocating, 
even if it would substantially impact the previous visitation schedule or 
negatively impact their relationship with the child.56  A noncustodial parent’s 
reasons for moving are irrelevant, and so are the objections of the custodial 
parent.57 
Missouri’s laws restrict all relocations made by custodial parents, no 
matter if they are across the country or across the street.58  Although many 
other states define a relocation as a move exceeding a certain distance (such as 
sixty or 150 miles),59 Missouri does not protect the right of parents to move 
short distances away without being the subject of litigation and a potential 
change in custody.60 
 
 55. See Janet Leach Richards, Children’s Rights v. Parent’s Rights: A Proposed Solution to 
the Custodial Relocation Conundrum, 29 N.M. L. REV. 245, 255–56 (1999). 
 56. See, e.g., Pastis, supra note 45, at 420; Richards, supra note 55, at 255; Bruch, supra 
note 34, at 283 
 57. Bruch, supra note 34, at 283.  
 58. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377 (2000); see, e.g., Sarah Downey, The Moving Van Wars: 
Relocation Is Becoming an Increasingly Contentious Issue for Ex-Spouses Who Must Balance 
Kids and Jobs, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 53, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/ 
82959. 
 59. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:355.1–9:355.17 (2006) (outside of state or 150 or more miles); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 107.159 (2007) (sixty or more miles from other parent); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-
37 (2008) (outside of state or 150 or more miles); Fossum v. Fossum, 545 N.W.2d 828, 832 (S.D. 
1996) (reversing the trial court’s order to transfer custody to the father when custodial parent 
sought to move seventy miles away for employment and holding that the general rule is that 
minor geographical changes should not be regarded as substantial changes in circumstances to 
change custody).  There have been several attempts to change Missouri’s relocation law to allow 
parents to move short distances away, but they have not been passed by the legislature.  See S.B. 
1006, 90th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000) (sixty miles); H.R. 722, 90th Gen. Assem., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000) (thirty miles); S.B. 539, 91st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001) 
(sixty miles); S.B. 539, 91st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001) (Sen. Sub. Substitute) (thirty 
miles); H.B. 1270, 94th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007) (fifty miles); H.B. 2123, 94th 
Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (fifty miles); H.B. 369, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Mo. 2009) (fifty miles). 
 60. When Missouri changed its relocation law in 1998, fathers’ rights advocate Senator 
McKenna proposed that there be an absolute prohibition from relocating the residence of a child 
further than fifty miles from the child’s current residence unless there was written consent of the 
other parent or an order of the court.  Karen Plax & Catherine J. Barrie, 1998 Changes In 
Missouri’s Family Law Statutes, 54 J. MO. B. JAN.– FEB. 1998 at 330.  But the Missouri Bar and 
the legislature considered “[a] specific mileage restriction on a custodial parent’s relocation of a 
child within the state [to be] arbitrary, unreasonable and probably unconstitutional.  However, 
some limitation on intrastate relocation was appropriate.”  Id.  This view focuses solely on the 
area where a court could restrict a parent’s movement, and ignores the possibility of creating a 
mileage area where a custodial parent could presumptively be entitled to move without court 
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Missouri’s relocation laws were modeled after the American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyer’s (“AAML”) Proposed Relocation Act.61  Missouri law 
requires that parents provide notice by certified mail with return receipt62 of a 
proposed relocation at least sixty days before the date of the proposed 
relocation.63  The notice must give the proposed new address (or city if the 
exact address is unknown), telephone number, date of the move, the reasons 
for the relocation, and a proposal for revised schedule of custody.64  There is a 
continuing duty to update the information as it changes.65 
If a parent fails to give the required statutory notice, the consequences may 
be drastic.  Failure to provide notice can be a factor in deciding whether 
custody should be modified,66 a basis for ordering the child to return,67 or as 
cause for requiring the relocating parent to pay the objecting party’s attorney’s 
fees and expenses.68  Additionally, failure to provide notice may be deemed a 
change in circumstances to modify custody or serve as a basis for holding the 
parent in contempt,69 loss of custody of the child,70 or even criminal 
penalties.71 
 
scrutiny.  The irony is, such a plan wouldbe more flexible for primary custodial parents who were 
seeking to relocate since it presumably gives them permission to move within fifty miles of the 
previous residence.  The current law, with no guidance given to mileage, allows courts to restrict 
parents from moving even within fifty miles.  See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 4–11.  
Although arbitrary, courts often consider mileage requirements when fashioning visitation 
schedules.  For example, see the widely used court-approved visitation form, which presumes that 
a non-domiciliary parent should not receive mid-week visitation unless the parent lives within a 
fifty-mile radius of the child.  MO. SUP. CT., COURT APPROVED PARENTING TIME FORM 68-A 
“SCHEDULE J,” available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=3673.  
 61. Plax & Barrie, supra note 60, at 330; American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 
Proposed Model Relocation Act, An Act Relating to the Relocation of the Principle Residence of a 
Child, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 1, 6–11 (1998) [hereafter Model Relocation Act]. 
 62. No court, however, has required that the notice meet these technical requirements.  See 
Kingsbury, supra note 34, at 86; Kell v. Kell, 53 S.W.3d 203, 208–09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); 
Weaver v. Kelling, 53 S.W.3d 610, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Baxley v. Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192, 
205–06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 63. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.2 (2000). 
 64. Id. § 452.377.2 (1–4). 
 65. Id. § 452.377.3. 
 66. Id. § 452.377.5(1). 
 67. Id. § 452.377.5(2). 
 68. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.5 (3) (2000). 
 69. Id. § 452.377.12; Chris Ford, Untying the Relocation Knot: Recent Developments and a 
Model for Change, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 8 (1997); Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 794 & 
n.11. 
 70. See Pastis, supra note 45, at 419; Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 794 & n.13. 
 71. See Ford, supra note 69, at 8–9 (noting that moving in violation of the court order could 
be deemed a criminal violation of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act); Bowermaster, supra 
note 40, at 794 & n.12 (citing cases where fines or imprisonment were imposed). 
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If the non-relocating parent wishes to object to the relocation, he or she 
must file an objection with the court within thirty days of receipt of the 
relocation notice accompanied by an affidavit explaining the specific reasons 
why the court should prohibit relocation.72  The party seeking to relocate must, 
in response, file an affidavit within fourteen days, supporting the reasons for 
the relocation and suggest a revised parenting plan.73  If the non-relocating 
parent does not file an objection within thirty days, the parent has waived his 
or her right to object to the relocation and the primary custodial parent is 
allowed to relocate without court approval.74  If, however, the non-custodial 
parent files an objection within thirty days, the custodial parent is not allowed 
to move until the court renders a decision.75 
In contested relocations, the custodial parent wishing to move bears the 
burden of proving that the relocation is made in good faith and is the child’s 
best interests.76  Although the statute does not define “good faith,”77 the court 
has defined good faith, for purposes of the relocation statute, as the “relocating 
parent’s motive or purpose for relocating being something other than to disrupt 
or deprive the non-relocating parent contact with the children.”78  In essence, 
the court has defined good faith as a lack of bad faith. 
The issue of when relocation is in the child’s best interests is more 
complex.  Before the passage of Missouri’s 1998 relocation statute, Missouri 
courts developed a four-factor test to determine whether a relocation should be 
allowed.  The courts considered: 
(1) [T]he prospective advantages of the move in improving the general quality 
of life for the custodial parent and child, (2) the integrity of the custodial 
parent’s motives in relocating (whether primarily to defeat or frustrate 
visitation and whether the custodial parent is likely to comply with substitute 
visitation orders), (3) the integrity of the noncustodial parent’s motives for 
opposing relocation and the extent to which it is intended to secure a financial 
advantage with respect to continuing child support, and (4) the realistic 
opportunity for visitation which can provide an adequate basis for preserving 
and fostering the noncustodial parent’s relationship with the child if relocation 
is permitted.79 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.; see also Baxley v Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192, 205–06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 75. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.7 (2000). 
 76. Id. § 452.377.9. 
 77. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (2000). 
 78. Swisher v. Swisher, 124 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 79. Michel v. Michel, 834 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Haralambie 
Handling Child Custody Cases, § 7.08 (1983)).  
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After the 1998 change in the statute, lower courts modified the Michel test.80  
In 2001, however, the Missouri Supreme Court declared that the Michel test 
was inconsistent with the new statute and that the new statute only required 
that courts consider: (1) if the move is in the child’s best interest; (2) if it is 
made in good faith; and (3) it complies with the statute.81  Missouri trial courts 
now apply the eight “best interests” factors set forth in § 452.375.2 when 
making decisions for initial custody placement or modifications: 
(1) The wishes of the child’s parents as to custody and the proposed 
parenting plan submitted by both parties; 
(2) The needs of the child for a frequent, continuing and meaningful 
relationship with both parties and the ability and willingness of 
parents to actively perform their functions as mother and father for the 
needs of the child; 
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, 
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s 
best interests; 
(4) Which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent, continuing, 
and meaningful contact with the other parent; 
(5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community 
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved, including 
any history of abuse of any individuals involved . . . .; 
(7) The intention of either parent to relocate the principle residence of the 
child; and 
(8) The wishes of a child as to the child’s custodian82 
Although residence restrictions on a parent’s relocation with the children 
were initially based on concerns about parental kidnapping and forum 
shopping, many of these concerns were alleviated by uniform laws governing 
the jurisdiction of child custody actions.83  The more modern reason for 
Missouri’s joint custody preference and relocation restrictions is the belief that 
children need frequent and continuous contact with two parents to thrive and to 
mitigate the damage of divorce.84  Some scholars argue that it is important for 
 
 80. Sadler v. Favro, 23 S.W.3d 253, 257–58 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 81. Stowe v. Spence, 41 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Mo. 2001). 
 82. See, e.g., Dorman v. Dorman, 91 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Cullison v. 
Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 511–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Abernathy v. Meier, 45 S.W.3d 917, 924 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 83. See Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 797–98. 
 84. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.2 (2000); Edwin J. Terry et al., Relocation: Moving 
Forward or Moving Backward?, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 983, 1013 (2000) (citing Frank F. 
Furstenberg, Jr. & Andrew J. Cherlin, THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 73 (1991)); but see 
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both the mother and the father to continue to co-parent their children to 
minimize the disruption divorce has caused.85  Others argue that forcing 
children to endure prolonged court battles that their parents wage over 
relocation and preventing mothers from pursuing their post-divorce goals 
threatens lasting psychological as well as economic damage upon both the 
mother and the child.86 
II.  DEBATE OVER RELOCATION STANDARDS 
About half of all American children spend approximately five years in a 
single-parent household.87  Divorce creates a crisis in a child’s life that causes 
the child to grieve for the loss of their intact family.88  A child’s post-divorce 
experiences and the way adults manage those experiences have a pronounced 
impact on a child’s personality and ability to establish adult relationships.89 
Psychologists have found several key factors that can improve or hinder a 
child’s distress after divorce.90  The most important consideration is the impact 
the psychological health and parenting practices of the custodial parent 
(usually the mother) can have on the child.91  Fathers, too, may make important 
contributions to the financial, social, and emotional well-being of children; 
although “the contribution is not made through a man’s sheer physical 
 
infra, notes 95–112 and accompanying text (discussing the psychological research that refutes 
that frequent contact with a parent is at always at the core of the child’s best interests). 
 85. Terry et al., supra note 84, at 1013 (citing Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Andrew J. 
Cherlin, THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 73 (1991)); Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 
311. 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 307–15. 
 87. Bruch, supra note 34, at 282 (citing Marsha K. Pruett et al., Critical Aspects of 
Parenting Plans for Young Children: Interjecting Data into the Debate About Overnights, 42 
FAM. CT. REV. 39, 39 (2004)). 
 88. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision at 3, In re 
Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (No. S107355) (citing PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN 
BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (1997)); E. 
MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 
111–14 (2002); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN, ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 
YEAR LANDMARK STUDY xxviii–xxx (2000). 
 89. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88, 
at 4 (citing HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 10 (2002)); Wallerstein & Tanke, supra 
note 38, at 308–10.  
 90. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88, 
at 4. 
 91. Id. at 4–5 (citing Eleanor Maccoby, Divorce and Custody: the Rights, Needs, and 
Obligations of Mother, Father, and Child, in THE INDIVIDUAL, THE FAMILY, AND SOCIAL GOOD: 
PERSONAL FULFILLMENT IN TIMES OF CHANGE 135, 164–65 (Gary Melton ed., 1995); 
HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 126. 
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presence”92 but rather, through the “quality of the relationship [with the 
child].”93 
Many courts have started to realize that what is good for the custodial 
parent (typically the mother), is often good for the child.94  Studies have found 
that effective parenting by the custodial parent is the single best line of defense 
against the stressors a child faces in post-divorce life.95 
In contrast, inter-parental hostility and aggression is the single most 
destructive force in the lives of children of divorce.96  Consistent hostility and 
aggression undermines a child’s sense of safety, which in turn prevents the 
child from maintaining a positive attitude toward future life experiences and 
can contribute to anxiety and phobias.97  In fact, frequent contact and 
transitions between warring parents is likely to aggravate a child’s suffering, 
rather than to promote his or her best interests.98  For this reason, family law 
scholars have noted that when parents are hostile or violent, a distant move 
 
 92. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88, 
at 7 (quoting HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 9). 
 93. Id. at 6–7; Robert D. Hess & Kathleen A. Camara, Post-Divorce Family Relationships as 
Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorce for Children, 35 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 94 (1979).  
A statistically significant correlation exists between the duration of visits that children spent with 
their father and the quality of their relationship with the father.  Id.  There is, however, 
statistically significant correlation between the frequency of visitation.  Id.  Thus, the 
relationships between children and their fathers can be promoted and maintained even with 
variations in distance and frequency of visitation, as long as the quality of their visitation time 
was maintained.  See id. 
 94. See Bruch, supra note 34, at 288–89.  Bruch argues that moves that improve the 
custodial parent’s life often improve the quality of life for the child because a custodial parent’s 
good parenting abilities “is the most effective protection for a child’s post-divorce well-being” 
and that children’s adult opportunities are often “shaped by their mothers’ post-divorce financial 
circumstances.”  Id.  Some courts have also realized this.  For example, in Arkansas, the court has 
found that “compelling job opportunities or the chance to finish an education provide a real 
advantage to the children and custodial parent.”  Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 
860 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). Additionally, the court found that “the choice and opportunity to be a 
stay-at-home parent can be a compelling job opportunity providing a real advantage to the 
children . . . and that ‘psychological and emotional aspects of relocation can be as advantageous 
as economic or educational aspects.’” Id. (citing Parker v. Parker, 55 S.W.3d 773, 779 (Ark. 
2001)). 
 95. Bruch, supra note 34, at 289 (citing HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 88). 
 96. See Janet M. Bowermaster, Relocation Custody Disputes Involving Domestic Violence, 
46 U. KAN. L. REV. 433, 433 (1998); Brief Supporting Affirmance of Ct. App,’s Decision, at 9, In 
re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (No. S107355); Bruch, supra note 34, at 291. 
 97. See Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 
88, at 9; Bowermaster, supra note 96 at 433; Bruch, supra note 34, at 291. 
 98. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88, 
at 9–10 (citing Janet R. Johnston, Research Update: Children’s Adjustment in Sole Custody 
Compared to Joint Custody Families and Principles for Custody Decision Making, 33 FAM. & 
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 415, 420–21 (1995)). 
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may actually be better for the child because it may limit the child’s exposure to 
his or her parents’ negative interactions.99  Certainly most, if not all, of the 
relocation cases that reach Missouri courts involve highly conflicted parents 
since a court does not even become involved in a parent’s relocation unless the 
non-custodial parent objects to the relocation.100 
Even though children’s exposure to their parents’ hostility and violence 
has serious emotional and psychological consequences, many states often 
prevent custodial parents from escaping abusive situations through relocation 
laws which contain no exceptions for custodial parents fleeing domestic 
violence.101  As a result of relocation restrictions, a parent fleeing domestic 
violence may have her child taken away from her and transferred to the 
abusive parent.102  Victims of domestic violence are likely overrepresented in 
relocation disputes.103  In some relocation cases, domestic violence is a factor 
even when not alleged by the victim.104 
 
 99. See Jacqueline M. Valdespino, Making the “Must Move” Case at Trial: Arguing that 
Relocation is Right for the Kids, 28 FAM. ADVOC. 19, 22 (2006); Janet R. Johnston et al., 
Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AM. 
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 576, 583 (1989) (finding that where children of high–conflict parents had 
more frequent access to both parents and more frequent transitions between the parents, they were 
most likely to be clinically disturbed). 
 100. See Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 796–97.  
 101. Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 433.  Missouri’s relocation statute provides that in 
certain exceptional circumstances the notice requirements of the statute may be waived to protect 
the health and safety of a child or adults, and the the court may take remedial action it considers 
necessary to “considers necessary to facilitate the legitimate needs of the parties and the best 
interest of the child.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.4 (2008).  It is not entirely clear, however, from 
the statute how a parent should proceed in seeking the court to waive the notice requirements.  
One interpretation would be that the parent would have to obtain a waiver from the court before 
relocating.  It is not clear whether the court may grant a waiver of the notice requirements after 
the parent has already relocated for safety reasons.  Even so, most parents would be wary of 
relocating first and seeking waiver of notice after the relocation.  If the court does not agree that 
the parent’s situation was an “exceptional circumstance,” the parent may face a variety of civil 
and/or criminal sanctions for removing the child from the state, including the possibility that the 
court would transfer custody of the child to the abusive parent.  See Id. § 452.377.12 (2008). 
 102. Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 433. 
 103. About one-half of all custody cases involve domestic violence, and domestic violence is 
frequently found in “high conflict” cases.  Couples in high conflict cases are more likely to seek 
court intervention.  As a result, Bowermaster hypothesizes that many relocation disputes that 
make themselves to court will involve domestic violence victims.  Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 
437. 
 104. See id. at 436 n.9.  Attorneys may discourage clients from disclosing domestic violence 
in custody suits for fear that judges will be angered and believe the allegations of abuse were 
raised only to gain a tactical advantage.  Id. (citing Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and 
Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal 
Professionals, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 65, 152–66 (1990); Merry Hofford et al., Family 
Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 
197, 217 (1995)). 
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Even without a history of domestic violence, conflict between a child’s 
parents can be serious enough to cause psychological trauma to a child.105  
Generally speaking, children caught in the middle of high-conflict custody 
disputes are two-to-five times more likely to have clinical levels of 
psychological disturbance.106  When joint custody arrangements are imposed 
on warring parents, they often maintain or increase conflict between the 
parents and hinder a child’s development.107 
Relocation restrictions are most often justified as intended to promote and 
maintain frequent and meaningful contact with both parents.108  If that is the 
goal, however, relocation restrictions fail to provide the solution.  As discussed 
in Part III, Section E, courts often “blackmail” custodial parents from 
relocating by threatening to change custody to the non-custodial parent if the 
custodial parent goes through with the relocation.109  But if the court does not 
succeed in the “blackmail game” and the custodial parent moves her residence 
anyway—without the child—the custodial parent, the parent that until now has 
been the primary caretaker of the child, is now denied “frequent and continuing 
contact” with the child.110  In such a scenario, the child now faces two types of 
difficult transitions—moving to a new residence and potentially a new town 
and school district to live with the non-custodial parent, and losing the day-to-
day relationship with the custodial parent.111 
At any rate, forcing parents to live near one another does not necessarily 
ensure that the child will be spared from emotional turmoil.  Similarly, forcing 
parents to frequently communicate and share custody of their children does not 
increase the likelihood that they will cooperate with one another.112  It is rare 
 
 105. E.g., Robert E. Emery, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Proponents Bear the Burden of 
Proof, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 8, 11–12 (2005); Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Andrew J. Cherlin, 
Divided Families: What Happens to Children When Parents Part, in THE FAMILY IN PUBLIC 
POLICY at 106–7 (Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Andrew J. Cherlin eds.) (1991); HETHERINGTON & 
KELLY, supra note 88, at 138; ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE 
CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 284–85 (1992).  See generally Bruch, supra 
note 34, at 291–92 (summarizing this research). 
 106. Janet R. Johnston et al., The Psychological Functioning of Alienated Children in Custody 
Disputing Families: An Explanatory Study, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 39, 55 (2005); see also 
Bruch, supra note 34, at 291 n. 35 (critiquing Johnson’s summary in Family Law Quarterly). 
 107. Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 
5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 278–79 (1987). 
 108. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 311. 
 109. Caroline Ritchie Heil, Relocation Cases As Change in Custody Proceedings: “Judicial 
Blackmail,” or Competing Interests Reconciled?, 51 S.C. L. REV. 885, 896 (2000). 
 110. Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 39, at 260. 
 111. Bruch, supra note 34, at 285. 
 112. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88, 
at 8 (citing ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND 
LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 183 (1992)). 
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for parents―even well-educated parents―to cooperate after a divorce.113  
Psychological studies show that even parents who manage to avoid conflict 
tend to do so by staying away from one another.114  Overall, the very reasons 
that legislatures justify imposing relocation restrictions on custodial parents 
have been called into question by the psychological community, which begs 
the question: are relocation restrictions necessary at all to serve the best 
interests of the child? 
III.  PROBLEM’S WITH MISSOURI’S RELOCATION LAW 
A. Burden of Proof 
Courts are often quick to reject legitimate relocation requests if they would 
complicate visitation with the non-custodial parent, often without considering 
the possibility of creating a revised custody schedule which would allow for 
longer, but less frequent visits.115  In Missouri, and several other states,116 the 
burden of proving that the relocation is in the child’s best interests falls on the 
relocating parent,117 usually the mother.  If the mother does not convince the 
judge that moving is in the child’s best interest, the judge will deny the 
relocation and order that if the mother ultimately moves, custody of the child 
will be transferred from the mother to the father.118  If the mother “chooses” to 
stay, however, she may retain custody of the child.119  One scholar opines that 
the state imposes on the mother the “cruelest [choice] of all,” the threat of 
taking her children, and “imposing a Sophie’s Choice of unconscionable 
proportions.”120  In these situations, the mother may be forced to litigate even 
if the father does not want custody or is not a suitable caretaker of the child.121 
 
 113. Id.  In the Maccoby and Mnookin study, only 29% of Northern California parents, who 
were generally well-educated, cooperated in parenting post-divorce.  Id.  The custody evaluator in 
the landmark California relocation case In re Marriage of LaMusga has stated that, “[C]hildren of 
divorce rarely have parents who support each other.”  PHILIP M. STAHL, PARENTING AFTER 
DIVORCE: A GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS AND MEETING YOUR CHILDREN’S NEEDS 46 
(2000). 
 114. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. of Appeal’s Decision, supra 
note 91, at 8 (citing ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 183 (1992)). 
 115. See Paige M. Dempsey, Casenote, Joint Custody and Relocation: The Supreme Court of 
Nebraska Limits Relocation of Parents Sharing Joint Custody in Brown v. Brown, 35 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 230–31 (2001), (criticizing a Nebraska court for failing to consider 
alternative visitation schedules before denying a relocation outright). 
 116. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 7. 
 117. MO. REV. STAT § 452.377.9 (2008). 
 118. See LaFrance, supra note 54, at 9. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Bruch, supra note 34, at 284 n.10. 
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Critics argue that the burden of proof falls on the wrong person in 
relocation disputes.122  Many scholars contend that the custodial parent should 
have a presumptive right to move, absent a showing by the non-custodial father 
that the move is not in the child’s best interests.123  These critics argue that the 
mother should be allowed to rely on the trial court’s initial custody order 
without fearing that a relocation request will trigger a re-evaluation of her 
parenting skills.124 This notion underscores the common sentiment in child 
custody law that a custody placement should not be modified unless there is a 
substantial change in circumstances, to ensure that the child remains with its 
primary caretaker or “psychological parent.”125  By placing the burden of proof 
on the mother, mothers must overcome an enormous barrier in order to 
successfully move. 
B. Practical Problems of Implementing the Law 
Missouri’s law is also plagued by many practical problems which make it 
extremely difficult for custodial parents to successfully relocate if the move is 
contested. 
1. Parents Seeking to Relocate Cannot Get a Court Date in Time 
Employers often need to make immediate personnel decisions and cannot 
hold employment offers indefinitely for parents who require months to provide 
statutory relocation notice and time to litigate the move.126  For parents who 
have an immediate opportunity, a delayed trial date can, by default, prevent 
them from obtaining the opportunity (job, education, etc.) which triggered their 
request to relocate.127  Non-custodial parents can use this as leverage to delay 
or even prevent the relocation.128  Even where non-custodial parents have not 
caused the delay, the courts are often so backlogged that it is virtually 
impossible for a mother, given the minimum required statutory relocation 
 
 122. See LaFrance, supra note 54, at 10–11. 
 123. See, e.g., Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 318; Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 
39, at 255. 
 124. See, e.g., Ann M. Driscoll, In Search of a Standard: Resolving the Relocation Problem 
in New York, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 211 (1997). 
 125. See, e.g., Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 39, at 247; Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 
39, at 318; see generally GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 11–12, 19–27, 101–07 (1996) 
(describing the need for continuity between a child and their primary caregiver). 
 126. Glennon, supra note 38, at 136–37 (citing Kaiser v. Kaiser, 23 P.3d 278 (Okla. 2001)). 
 127. See Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 460 (explaining that abused parents often lose out on 
employment opportunities because they have a short time for accepting an employment offer 
(about thity days) but often have to wait months for a relocation hearing). 
 128. Id. at 460. 
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notice (sixty days), to receive a trial court ruling before the day she was set to 
relocate.129 
In virtually all cases, a significant trial delay can prejudice or 
inconvenience the custodial parent, but the situation becomes much more 
drastic in domestic violence situations.  Janet Bowermaster tells a compelling 
story about Deb C., a victim of physical, sexual, and verbal abuse.130  Deb’s 
husband not only attacked her but also severely attacked police officers sent in 
to help Deb.131  Deb’s husband stalked, harassed, threatened, and attacked her 
in public and she feared for her life.132  In all, it took over two and a half years 
after Deb filed for divorce before she was allowed to move away from her 
violent husband,133 and she was told that if she relocated without court 
approval, she would be prosecuted under federal kidnapping laws and her 
husband would get custody of their son.134  Such lengthy delays are not an 
aberration in relocation disputes.  Several Missouri cases indicate a clear 
problem in receiving a timely hearing.135  In one case, it took over a year after 
the custodial mother sent her relocation notice before the trial court heard the 
case.136  It took another year before the appellate court rendered its decision.137  
Missouri needs to ensure parents seeking time-sensitive relocations that their 
cases will be quickly resolved. 
2. Trial Courts Expect Relocating Parents to Produce Evidence at Trial 
Which is Impracticable or Impossible 
Missouri’s relocation statute requires parents to give notice of the proposed 
new address, if known.138  Pragmatic parents realizing that the court may find 
relocation is not in the child’s best interest and ultimately prevent the move 
will often not be able to provide an exact future address until after the 
 
 129. Consider Shelly Osia who gave seventy-six days notice of her relocation (sixteen days 
more than was required by law).  Even with a relatively quick trial date, Shelly did not get a 
hearing until almost a month after she was slated to relocate.  It took another month for the judge 
to issue his ruling.  It took over another year before the appellate court rendered its decision. In 
all, the ordeal took about a year and a half to resolve.  See Appellant’s Brief at 5, Osia v. Osia, 
260 S.W.3d 438, (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 130. See Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 433–35. 
 131. Id. at 433. 
 132. Id. at 433–34. 
 133. Id. at 435. 
 134. Id.  
 135. See, e.g., Ratteree v. Will, 258 S.W.3d 864, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Schlotman v. 
Costa, 193 S.W.3d 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).   
 136. Johnston v. Dunham, 172 S.W.3d 442, 442–45 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).  In Johnston, trial 
did not occur until over a year after the mother’s relocation notice.  Id. at 144.  The appellate 
court issued a decision over two years after the request to relocate.  Id. at 442. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.1 (2008). 
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relocation has been granted.  Most parents lack the financial resources to buy a 
home or risk breaking a lease if the court refuses to allow them to relocate.139  
As a result, these parents will often list only the city on their relocation notice, 
with the idea that they will finalize their housing decision after they have 
permission to move.140  Similarly, parents cannot accurately predict which 
school district or daycare their child will attend.  For children attending public 
schools, the districts will be determined by the geographic area where the 
parent lives.  For children who will be attending private school or daycare, 
many programs have limited openings and require a deposit to hold a child’s 
slot.  Many parents may not take the financial risk of paying for these 
programs unless they know their child will be certain to attend. 
Yet courts have ignored these obvious realities.  Courts will often find that 
a parent’s move is not in the child’s best interest if the mother cannot prove 
where they will be living, what the neighborhood is like, what school the child 
will attend, or how long their daily commute will be.141  The result may be 
discrimination against relocating parents with low incomes.  Wealthier 
individuals could perhaps afford to buy a new home or to break a lease on an 
apartment if they were not allowed to move.  This option, however, may not be 
available for most litigants. 
Likewise, courts usually refuse to grant a parent permission to relocate for 
employment if the employment offer is not concrete.142  This ignores the 
 
 139. Consider that Shelly Osia had already purchased a new home, and sold her old home 
while the relocation was pending.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 10.  After the trial court 
refused to allow her to move, she presumably had to find a new place to live.  Certainly, many 
parents seeking relocation familiar with Shelly’s plight would be wary of purchasing a new home 
or selling their current home until they had assurance that they could relocate. 
 140. See Fohey v. Knickerbocker, 130 S.W. 3d 730, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (mother 
delayed housing decisions until the relocation was approved by the court). 
 141. See id.: 
In addition to providing no evidence regarding Myranda’s new home, mother also 
presented no evidence about Myranda’s new neighborhood, nor what recreational 
opportunities would be available to Myranda in her new neighborhood.  Mother explains 
that she was deferring such decisions until she had received court approval to relocate.  
While we can appreciate her position, it was mother’s burden to show that the move was 
in Myranda’s best interest.  And thus, it would have behooved mother to provide the trial 
court with some evidence as to Myranda’s proposed living environment. 
See also Wilson v. Wilson, 873 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (“Mother provided no plan 
for living arrangements which would provide a stable environment for [child] in Rhode Island.  
That alone is sufficient to support the denial of mother’s request to remove [child] to Rhode 
Island.”); Koenig v. Koenig, 782 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding it was not in child’s 
best interest to move with mother to New Hampshire to live with mother’s new husband, noting 
that the mother provided little evidence about the proposed living arrangements); Samuels v. 
Samuels, 713 S.W.2d 865, 869–70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 142. See, e.g., Lowery v. Lowery, 287 S.W.3d 693, 695–96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (“Mother 
also did not have a job in Florida, but testified that she believed she could obtain employment at 
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reality that employers, familiar with the uphill battle relocating parents face, 
may refuse to give a firm offer of employment to parents who cannot relocate 
without the consent of the court or the other parent.143  Courts should refrain 
from requiring parents to prove facts that they realistically cannot. 
Sometimes other evidence produced at trial is of little value in determining 
whether a move is beneficial.  For example, judges often hear evidence about 
the comparison of schools, parks, weather, and sometimes even factors such as 
crime rates and air quality.144  In fact, one article targeted at family law 
practitioners advises them of the advantages of presenting evidence of better 
schools, a bigger home, less traffic, less crime, and better extracurricular 
activities through photographs or videos.145  But things such as schools, parks, 
or crime rates are rarely the reason why the parent sought to move in the first 
place.146  Nor are they usually the reasons for a non-custodial parent’s 
objection to the move.147 
As Janet Bowermaster points out, non-custodial parents do not contest 
relocations out of concern that their children will be living in a small town, or 
that their new school will have fewer academic choices, or there are fewer 
cultural opportunities for the child to experience,148 although non-custodial 
parents often raise such issues in relocation litigation.  Such evidence is not 
useful and requires parents to do nothing more than play to the judge’s 
personal preferences.149  If judges were forced to decide all cases based on 
superfluous evidence, they would presumably allow every move to Maine, 
 
the Publix grocery store where she had worked previously.”); Buck v. Buck, 279 S.W.3d 547, 
551 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) ( acknowledging the move would improve quality of the mother’s home 
and found that the general quality of the mother or children’s lives would be improved because 
the mother lacked employment);Vaughn v. Bowman, 209 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) 
(affirming the move was not in the child’s best interest where the step-father may be required to 
move for a position at the fire department, but at the time of trial, no position was available); 
Samuels v. Samuels, 713 S.W.2d 865, 869–70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (criticizing the mother’s plans 
as “too speculative” and noting that she didn’t “have a definite job”). 
 143. Glennon, supra note 38, at 136 (citing In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo. 
2005) (finding that the employerwas unwilling to make offer until parent stated intent to 
relocate)). 
 144. Duggan, supra note 44, at 199. 
 145. See Valdespino, supra note 99, at 20–24. 
 146. Duggan, supra note 44, at 198. 
 147. Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 799; Bruch, supra note 34, at 282.  Bruch notes that the 
usual reasons for objections to relocation are fears that less time with the child or less frequent 
interactions with the child will weaken the parent–child relationship and concerns about the 
quality of the custodial parent’s caretaking skills.  Id.  More nebulous reasons such as the 
potential inconvenience and cost of travel for visitation, or an attempt to control or battle with the 
custodial parent provide additional reasons for resisting relocation.  Id. 
 148. Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 799. 
 149. Duggan, supra note 44, at 199. 
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considered the most child-healthy state, and reject every move to Mississippi, 
the most child-unhealthy state.150 
Courts should create evidentiary rules to exclude such statistical evidence 
unless the parties can link it to actual child improvement or diminishment.  For 
example, the same evidence may be admissible if, say, there had been a rash of 
violent crimes within the neighborhood where the child will reside, if moving 
to a new city with air pollution problems would exacerbate a child’s medical 
condition, or if evidence showed that changing school districts would offer 
more resources to assist a child’s unique educational needs.151 
Creating evidentiary standards which limit the introduction of these 
problematic types of evidence would be helpful in ensuring that family court 
judges decide a case based on its actual merits rather than illusory “crime 
rates” or the implication that a relocating parent has not diligently prepared for 
the move because she cannot provide an exact address. 
3. Relocation Decisions Evade Meaningful Review 
Another important factor, which propounds the errors of the trial court, is 
that relocation decisions often evade meaningful appellate review.152  Often by 
the time a case has reached an appellate court, the litigant has abandoned the 
very opportunity that created her request to relocate.153  Moreover, it is often 
prohibitively expensive to appeal child custody cases.  Parents who are 
financially struggling, or seeking to relocate for economic reasons, usually 
mothers, are often prevented from appealing decisions that they believe are 
erroneous.154 
 
 150. Id. (citing THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS COUNT (2006), available at 
http://www.aecf.org/kidscount/). 
 151. For example, in Osia, evidence showing that the new school district had programs to 
better accommodate the Osia sons’ learning disabilities should be admissible because it is not a 
statistical composite of information, but rather, information directly affecting the children’s 
needs.  Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 9. 
 152. Glennon, supra note 38, at 136 (“[C]ases that reach an appellate decision are most likely 
only a small percentage of custodial parents who want to relocate but who are unable to effectuate 
their choice.”); Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 
69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 351 (1993). 
 153. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text. 
 154. Glennon, supra note 38, at 137 (“The expense custodial parents must assume in order to 
litigate their right to relocate may also prevent parents from seeking judicial permission to 
relocate.”).  The Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice reported tremendous problems in 
family law regarding financial impediment to the courts.  Missouri Task Force on Gender & 
Justice, Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L. REV. 485, 528–29 
(1993).  Although the Task Force published its results in 1993, little has changed in the family 
court system, and no other task force has been created to investigate the problems.  Id.  The Task 
Force found that the “lack of financial resources [is] a serious problem in access to the courts in 
family law matters” and that litigants, most often women, yield on promising claims because of 
lack of financial resources.  Id.  A former chairman of the Missouri Bar Family Law Section 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] CONSIGNING WOMEN TO THE IMMEDIATE ORBIT OF A MAN 1385 
Appellate courts themselves cannot settle on a uniform method to evaluate 
trial court errors in relocation cases and often create a hodge-podge of 
appellate decisions which reflect no apparent rule governing relocation.  For 
example, in Osia v. Osia, the appellate court refused to reverse a trial court’s 
ruling that a mother could not move thirty-four miles away from her previous 
residence, even though the father’s objections to the relocation were tenuous at 
best.155  But in In re Marriage of Williams, handed down a year earlier, the 
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court denying mother’s motion 
to relocate.156  The appellate court reasoned that the distance was only fifty-
five miles away and that it would be unrealistic to inflexibly confine her to a 
geographic area, even though the move was across state lines.157  Certainly if 
dissolution and child custody cases reveal the “greatest opportunity to observe 
and judge the fairness of our courts’ operations,” then these inconsistent and 
biased rulings show that our courts are failing in its “institutional obligation to 
ensure litigants fair and effective access to the courts and to render decisions 
grounded in economic and psychological realities of the family unit . . . .”158 
Finally, the standard of appellate review is often very high—in most states, 
it is “abuse of discretion.”159  The high level of deference to trial court 
decisions has been criticized as encouraging “inconsistency and arbitrariness” 
in relocation cases.160  Because a “best interest” determination necessarily 
involves a very subjective evaluation by the trial judge and a weighing of the 
credibility of the parties, most appellate courts lack a meaningful way of 
determining whether the trial court committed error.161  Discouraged by this 
high standard of proof, very few litigants appeal their child custody and 
relocation cases.162 
 
testified that economic control can often be determinative of who will succeed in family law 
cases.  Id.  One attorney remarked, “How many clients can afford $5,000.00, $10,000.00 to 
appeal a case?”  Id. at 539–40. 
 155. See Osia, 260 S.W.3d at 438; Appellant’s Brief at 7, Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438, (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2008); see supra notes and accompanying text 26–29 discussing the father’s objections 
to the relocation. 
 156. In re Marriage of Williams, 220 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 527. 
 159. See Law & Hennessey, supra note 152, at 351; Hon. Arline S. Rotman et. al., 
Reconciling Parents’ and Children’s Interests in Relocation: In Whose Best Interests?, 38 FAM. 
& CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 341, 364–65 (2000); Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note 
154, at 540. 
 160. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 57–58. 
 161. Law & Hennessey, supra note 152, at 350–51; see infra notes 173–82 and accompanying 
text. 
 162. Law & Hennessey, supra note 152, at 351; see also LaFrance, supra note 54, at 57–58 
(stating the appellate deference discourages “the very appeals which might rationalize 
outcomes”). 
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C. Best Interest Standards 
Missouri appellate court decisions regarding relocation lack a consistent 
rule to confirm or deny locations.163  Even decisions within one appellate 
district often contradict each other.164  The result is that the outcome of a 
custodial parent’s relocation request may largely depend on the appellate 
district in which the custodial parent resides.165  One author criticizing 
Missouri’s scheme opined: “If the only predictability in the system is the fact 
that one division will more likely grant relocation than another, the state has 
failed to enact a statutory and judicial decision-making scheme that is just and 
supportive of the new family unit.”166  Missouri is not the only state whose 
relocation law lacks consistency and uniformity.  Nationally, there is no 
uniform approach to how states deal with relocation disputes, leading to 
confusion and unpredictability regarding how courts will rule on any given 
issue.167 
Part of the problem underscoring the lack of uniformity is the standard 
used to decide relocation disputes.  Missouri, like every other jurisdiction 
deciding relocation disputes, uses the “best interests of the child” to make 
relocation decisions.168  Professor Bowermaster, noting the irony that every 
jurisdiction uses the same test with widely divergent outcomes, argues that the 
test can serve no real purpose as a decisional guideline.169  Statutes governing 
relocation often list factors courts should consider when determining the best 
interests of the child, including age, special needs, and the health of the parties 
 
 163. Ford, supra note 69, at 35. Compare Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2008) (denying relocation 25 miles away) with In re Williams, 220 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2007) (overturning trial court’s decision to refuse relocation when mother was only seeking 
to move 55 miles away since “relocation would [not] prohibit Father from continuing his active 
role in the child’s life.”) with Kell v. Kell, 53 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that 
a mother’s move from Missouri to Florida was in the child’s best interest). 
 164. Ford, supra note 69, at 36–40. 
 165. Id. at 40. 
 166. Id.  
 167. See, e.g., Amie J. Tracia, Navigating the Waters of Massachusetts Child Relocation Law: 
Assessing the Application of the Real Advantage Standard, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 
139, 141 (2008); Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 217 (N.J. 2001); Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 
145, 149 (N.Y. 1996) (criticizing previous relocation regime as “difficult to apply”); Ford, supra 
note 69, at 19 (noting that open-ended best interest analyses have led to a lack of uniformity and 
reliability in many courts); Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“our 
research has failed to reveal a consistent, universally accepted approach to the question of when a 
custodial parent may relocate out-of-state over the objection of the non-custodial parent. . . . 
Across the country, applicable standards remain distressingly disparate.”); Hollandsworth v. 
Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 863 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). 
 168. Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 799. 
 169. Id. 
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and children.170  But most statutes do not prioritize the factors171 and may 
allow the court to consider any other factor that the court deems relevant.172 
The standard creates an Orwellian scenario in which every decision of the 
custodial parent is examined under a microscope.173  The judge and the non-
custodial parent serve as Big Brother, examining every large and small choice 
the custodial parent, usually the mother, makes.  As discussed in Part III, 
Section D, such intrusion into private family life implicates constitutional 
concerns. 
The best interests standard gives judges extremely broad discretion,174 so 
much so that the test has been called “a euphemism for unbridled judicial 
discretion”175 and “a vague platitude [rather] than a legal or scientific standard” 
that is subject to abuse by judges who use it to further their own interests.176  
Many commentators have half-seriously suggested that when both parents are 
fit caretakers, it is likely to be just as accurate to flip a coin to decide custody 
than it is to use vague and ambiguous “best interest” standards.177 
This vagueness allows divorce courts to “pay lip-service” to the standard 
as a way of masking bias.178 
Judges, too, express discomfort using the best interests test.179  For 
example, Judge Gary Crippen has attacked the doctrine on grounds that it 
 
 170. Charlow, supra note 107, at 268. 
 171. Id. 
 172. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (2000) (specifying various factors to consider but not 
limiting courts analysis to those factors.) 
 173. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 136 (quoting Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of 
Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 816–17 (1985)). 
 174. See, e.g., Rotman et. al., supra note 159, at 364–65; Ford, supra note 69, at 3. 
 175. Charlow, supra note 107, at 269. 
 176. Id. at 267; Katherine C. Sheehan, Post-Divorce Child Custody and Family Relocation, 9 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 135, 138 (1986) (calling the best interests test “intrusive, unworkable, and 
indeterminate”). 
 177. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 257–62 (1975); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET. AL., 
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 153 n.12 (1973); Duggan, supra note 44, at 193 
(suggesting that playing rock, paper, scissors to determine relocation cases is likely to be just as 
accurate as using traditional vague best interest factors). 
 178. Alexandra Selfridge, Equal Protection and Gender Preference in Divorce Contests Over 
Custody, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 170–71 (2007); Law & Hennessey, supra note 153, 
at 350–51.  See also Rotman et al., supra note 160, at 364 (arguing that judges use their own 
experiences when considering the child’s best interests and explaining that “[e]very judge, no 
matter how conscientious, brings his or her particular point of view into the courtroom” which 
makes the best interest standard very subjective); Charlow, supra note 107, at 262 (arguing the 
standard is marred by personal and cultural bias).. 
 179. Charlow, supra note 107, at 269, 270 (citing Charnas, Practice Trends in Divorce 
Related Child Custody, 4 J. DIVORCE 57 (1981)); Eleanor E. Maccoby, Editorial, A Cogent Case 
for a New Child Custody Standard, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. i, i (2005) (“Judges . . . [find] it 
well-nigh impossible to determine which of two contesting parents can best support the children’s 
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“risks unwise results, stimulates litigation, permits manipulation and abuse, 
and allows a level of judicial discretion that is difficult to reconcile with an 
historic commitment to the rule of law.”180 
Overall, the best interest of the child analysis creates an “exhaustive, 
intrusive, and expensive investigation of [one’s life] and plans.”181  The test 
encourages litigation: since neither side can predict the outcome, parties 
overestimate their chance of success and are more willing to litigate.182  By 
implication, the increased likelihood of litigation also increases the price tag of 
the legal bill.183  On the other hand, parties may likewise agree to “bad” 
settlements rather than risk uncertain results in litigation.184  Missouri lacks a 
test that limits the scope of judicial inquiry while adequately weighing a 
child’s interests. 
D. Constitutional Problems 
Missouri’s relocation law is vulnerable to many constitutional attacks—
among them, the right to travel, the right to marry, and the right to family 
privacy.  Consider the story of Cynthia Buchheit as an example of 
constitutional issues at stake in Missouri’s relocation law.185  In 2006, after a 
contentious divorce and modification, Ms. Buchheit notified her ex-husband, 
Ricardo Berkbigler, of her intent to relocate with the couple’s child.186  The 
relocation notice sent by Ms. Buchheit came after a contentious modification 
 
long-term well-being.”); Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note 154, at 539 (explaining 
that Missouri judges often feel discomfort in making decisions on private family matters and feel 
difficultly deciding cases when there is “no clear legal solution”). 
 180. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody 
Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker 
Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 499–500 (1990) (internal citation omitted); see also Robert 
Pfenning, Note and Comment, The Best Interests of the Child: Do the Courts’ Subjective Factors 
in Determining “Best Interests” Really Benfit the Child?, 17 J. JUV. L. 117, 128 (1996) (arguing 
that judges manipulate statutory factors to interject their personal biases in a way that is unlikely 
to be reversed on appeal).  
 181. Sheehan, supra note 176, at 137. 
 182. Charlow, supra note 107, at 270; see also Ford, supra note 69, at 2–4 (recalling a case 
where the state’s relocation law afforded judges significant discretion, and choosing the litigation 
strategy was difficult because of the uncertain consequences of seeking court permission to 
relocate); Maccoby, supra note 179, at i. 
 183. Duggan, supra note 44, at 194–95; see id. at 197 (arguing that the money spent in 
relocation disputes violates a cardinal rule of economics—that it is not worth proceeding when 
marginal costs exceed marginal gains). 
 184. Charlow, supra note 107, at 273; See e.g. Ford, supra note 69, at 4–5 (noting that the 
unpredictable outcome puts women at a weaker negotiating position, and increases the likelihood 
that women will make concessions they otherwise would not make in order to move). 
 185. Brief for Appellant at 2–4, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Sept. 
17, 2007), 2007 WL 3054639. 
 186. Id. 
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proceeding, less than a year after the divorce, in which Ms. Buchheit was 
granted sole legal custody of the minor child because the parties could not 
communicate with one another.187 
Ms. Buchheit’s proposed relocation would have taken her from her 
parent’s home in Perryville, Missouri to Festus, Missouri, a distance of roughly 
forty-two miles.188  Ms. Buchheit’s proposed relocation was prompted by her 
recent engagement to her fiancé, Mr. Courtway, who lived and worked near 
Festus, her desire to move out of her parents’ home, and her need to be able to 
cohabitate with her new spouse upon remarriage.189 
Ms. Buchheit’s relocation was opposed by her ex-husband, Mr. 
Berkbigler.190  The trial court, in reliance on the statutory factors in section 
452.377, held that Ms. Buchheit’s proposed relocation of forty-two miles 
would “have a significant impact on [Mr. Berkbigler’s] ability to maintain his 
weekday visitations” and would be “logistically impractical” for Mr. 
Berkbigler.191  The trial court also, not once, but three times, maintained that 
the move was not in the best interest of the child because the move would 
“limit the child’s ability to regularly care for and play with his multiple pets at 
his father’s home,” and that the child’s “ability to enjoy his pets would be 
diminished considerably by the loss of the mid-week visitation period.”192  
Additionally, the trial court was unconvinced that “the quality of education in 
the Festus school district . . . would be any better than the education the child 
[was] receiving” at his current school.193  Consequently, the trial court denied 
Ms. Buchheit’s relocation.194  The denial was affirmed by the Missouri Court 
of Appeals Eastern District in an unpublished memorandum opinion.195 
1. Right to Travel 
There is, perhaps, no more eloquent way to illustrate one’s constitutional 
right to travel than the words penned by Justice Jackson in Edwards v. 
California:196 
 
 187. Id. at *3. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Brief for Appellant at 2–3, 6–7, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 
Sept. 17, 2007), 2007 WL 3054639; Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 
89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Sept. 17, 2007), 2007 WL 4623414. 
 190. Brief for Respondent at 5, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Oct. 
16, 2007), 2007 WL 3249950. 
 191. Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 04PR–CV00345–01, at 2–3 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Perry County, 
Nov. 16, 2006) (judgment denying petitioner’s request to relocate with the child). 
 192. Id. at 3–4. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 6. 
 195. Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113, slip op. at 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 196. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).  
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  This Court should . . . hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of 
the United States, protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the 
Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent 
residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof.  If national 
citizenship means less than this, it means nothing.197 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that citizens have a constitutional 
right to travel and migrate within the United States.198  As Justice Stewart 
stated, this right is “not a mere conditional liberty subject to regulation and 
control under conventional due process or equal protection standards . . . .  [I]t 
is a virtually unconditional personal right.”199  The right to travel has been 
defined as guaranteed by the privileges and immunities clause.200  Some have 
viewed this right as stemming from a liberty interest guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment:201  “[O]ur constitutional concepts of personal 
liberty . . . require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and 
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which 
unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”202  Others have viewed the 
right to travel through the lens of the commerce clause.203  The importance and 
recognition of an individual’s right to travel predates even our own 
Constitution, as this right was recognized explicitly in the Articles of 
Confederation.204  While many courts have overlooked this important right in 
relocation cases and statutes, the right to travel is one firmly engrained in our 
nation’s history and culture.205 
Missouri’s relocation law infringes upon a custodial parent’s right to travel 
because it restricts the parent’s movement within a geographical area if the 
 
 197. Id. at 183(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 198. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642–43 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“The constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . has been firmly established and 
repeatedly recognized.” (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966))). 
 199. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
 200. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 202. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629. 
 203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); see Edwards, 
314 U.S. at 166. 
 204. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, § 1; see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 
(1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (holding that the “unmistakable essence” of the right to travel is 
found in the “document that transformed a loose confederation of States into one Nation”). 
 205. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1379 (2d ed. 1998) (“[The 
right to travel] relates as much to the importance of lifting all artificial barriers to personal 
mobility as to the virtues of an integrated national economy and society.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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parent wishes to retain custody of her child.  A law which prohibits or burdens 
a person’s fundamental right to travel demands strict scrutiny.206  Additionally, 
if a law serves no other purpose “‘than to chill the assertion of constitutional 
rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then [the law] [is] 
patently unconstitutional.’”207  Missouri’s relocation law certainly qualifies as 
one which “unduly burdens” an individual’s right to travel and may, in effect, 
serve no other purpose than to “chill the assertion” of that very right. 
Whether Missouri’s relocation law can withstand strict scrutiny requires an 
examination of the compelling state interests being asserted by the state.  
Certainly, Missouri would assert that it has a compelling interest in ensuring 
the well-being of Missouri’s children and that such responsibility is reserved to 
the management of the states.208 
In Missouri, the state’s responsibility over children’s “welfare” has 
essentially been incorporated into the relocation statute as a judicial 
determination of whatever the court decides is in the child’s “best interest.”209  
As discussed previously, however, this standard is so vague and nebulous as to 
amount to little more than a mere “euphemism for unbridled judicial 
discretion.”210 
A good example of this can be found in Buchheit v. Berkbigler,211 the case 
referenced at the beginning of this section.  In Berkbigler, the trial court relied 
heavily on the child’s menagerie of animals at his father’s house as a 
seemingly important factor in determining what it considered to be in the 
child’s best interest, holding that midweek visitation was important for the 
minor child to cultivate his relationship with his pets.212  Decisions such as the 
one in Berkbigler illustrate why the “best interest” standard is not definite or 
narrowly tailored enough to meet strict scrutiny: even if the child were in fact 
happier taking more frequent care of his animals, this would still not justify the 
curtailment of Ms. Buchheit’s fundamental right to travel. 
 
 206. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904–05 (1986). 
 207. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).  
 208. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”); see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (“Throughout our history the 
several States have exercised their police powers to protect the health and safety of their 
citizens.”). 
 209. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.8 (West 2000). 
 210. Charlow, supra note 107, at 269. 
 211. No. 04PR–CV00345–01, at 5 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Perry County, Nov. 16, 2006) (judgment 
denying petitioner’s request to relocate with the child); see supra notes 211–21 and 
accompanying text. 
 212. Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 04PR–CV00345–01, at 3–4 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Perry County, 
Nov. 16, 2006) (judgment denying petitioner’s request to relocate with the child); see also Miers 
v. Miers, 53 S.W.3d 592, 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that child could maintain meaningful 
relationship with half-siblings only during weekend, holiday, and summer visitation with mother). 
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Further, in assessing the mother’s proposed move of merely forty-two 
miles, the court surely could have utilized less intrusive means to promote 
frequent and meaningful contact between father and child than by denying the 
mother the right to relocate her place of residence.213  The conflict between the 
mother’s fundamental right to travel and the father’s right to frequent and 
meaningful contact with his son was illusory.  If, as the trial court said, 
midweek visitation would no longer be possible, extended time over weekends 
or holidays could have been procured for father in order to compensate for any 
lost time.  Transportation costs could have easily been reallocated to offset any 
increase in expenses suffered by father as the result of mother’s move.  The 
court did not use the least intrusive means at its disposal to balance these 
competing interests because it determined that by acting under the guise of the 
child’s “best interests” it was not obligated to mitigate the harm to the rights of 
either party.  Placing the burden on a relocating parent to show that the 
relocation is in her child’s best interests impermissibly burdens the free 
exercise of that parent’s constitutional rights, and several state supreme courts 
have recently reached this same conclusion.214  In Jaramillo v. Jaramillo,215 
the New Mexico Supreme Court, in overturning a lower court’s decision to bar 
a mother from relocating, held that “placing [a] burden on the relocating parent 
and favoring the resisting parent with a corresponding presumption that 
relocation is not in the child’s best interest unconstitutionally impairs the 
relocating parent’s right to travel.”216  Such a burden of proof would require 
the custodial parent to “prove she has a right to exercise her rights.”217 
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Watt v. Watt,218 also affirmed that a 
burden placed upon the right to travel by that state’s relocation statute was 
unconstitutionally permissible: 
The right of travel enjoyed by a citizen carries with it the right of a custodial 
parent to have the children move with that parent.  This right is not to be 
denied, impaired, or disparaged unless clear evidence before the court . . . 
establishes the detrimental effect of the move upon the children.219 
 
 213. Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 04PR–CV00345–01, at 6 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Perry County, Nov. 
16, 2006) (denying petitioner’s request to relocate with the child). 
 214. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 146 (Colo. 2005); Jaramillo v. 
Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 305 (N.M. 1992); Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 615–16 (Wyo. 1999).  
 215. 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1992). 
 216. Id. at 305. 
 217. Arthur LaFrance, supra note 54, at 1, 1; see Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 305; Duggan, supra 
note 44, at 198. 
 218. 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999) 
 219. Id. at 615–16; see also In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005) 
(“[T]hough [the relocation law] does not prohibit outright a majority time parent from relocating, 
it chills the exercise of that parent’s right to travel because, in seeking to relocate, that parent risks 
losing majority parent status with respect to the minor child.”). 
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Additionally, the court noted that while “a ‘father’s change in visitation 
due to mother’s relocation is unfortunate, [it is] not an unusual result of 
divorce,’” and that “‘the advantages of the move [should not] be sacrificed . . . 
solely to maintain weekly visitation by the father where reasonable alternative 
visitation is available . . . .”220  Addressing the issue of intrastate application of 
the constitutional right to travel, the court held that it would be “incongruous” 
for these constitutional liberties to apply only to situations involving interstate 
travel and not to apply equally to travel conducted wholly intrastate.221 
As Professor Brigitte Bodenheimer, known for her drafting of the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), argued as early as 1977, punitive 
orders that require custodial parents to give up custody of their children in 
order to exercise their right to travel are unconstitutional penalties and were 
unenforceable under the UCCJA.222  Over thirty years ago she argued that “it is 
a safe prophesy that the right-to-move issue in this context is a constitutional 
question whose time has come or is overdue.”223  She stressed that: 
Impediments on changes of residence held unconstitutional [by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Dunn and Shapiro] are minimal in comparison with the 
restraints placed on parents [who seek to relocate with their children].  
Imposing the condition of leaving the children behind places the most direct 
and oppressive burden on the exercise of constitutional freedom one can 
imagine.224 
A court or statute that prohibits a relocating parent’s right to travel, when 
other alternatives for frequent and meaningful visitation exist for the non-
relocating parent, does not act in a manner narrowly tailored to meet the state’s 
interests.225  There is no compelling state interest that would demand an 
 
 220. Watt, 971 P.2d at 614 (citing Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Wyo. 1993)). 
 221. Id. at 615 (citing King New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth. 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 
1971)). 
 222. Brigitte Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and 
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive Modifications, 65 CAL. L. 
REV. 978, 1008–09 (1977). 
 223. Id. at 1009. 
 224. Id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
642 (1969)). 
 225. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 77; See id. at 77–78 where LaFrance argues the only 
compelling state interest is endangerment, since there are reasonable alternatives available to 
protect the father’s interests; see also, In re Sheley, 895 P.2d 850 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995), 
overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1997) (finding 
that the constitutional right to travel requires that the burden be placed on the noncustodial parent 
who is opposing the move); the Sheley court further states:  
[T]he nonresidential parent who wishes the court to restrict the residential parent’s right to 
relocate with the child has the burden of proving more than simply that the restriction will 
serve the best interests of the child.  He or she must also prove that the proposed 
relocation would be detrimental to the child in some specific way that is not inherent in 
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identical degree of visitation to what was in place before relocation, but rather, 
the state’s interest is satisfied when the parties, or a court, can produce a viable 
alternative.226 
Moreover, Missouri law appears to give no consideration to the ability of 
the father to move and follow the mother.  Accordingly, the law is likely 
overinclusive in allowing courts to prevent the relocation of the mother when 
the father himself could, but chooses not to, relocate with the mother if he 
wanted to stay in close proximity to the child.227 
Perhaps such a move would be unrealistic because of the father’s job or 
family commitments, but it is often no more unrealistic than the commitments 
that the mother is required to give up in order to maintain custody of her 
child.228  Preventing a mother’s relocation without considering the father’s 
ability to follow essentially forces the mother to give up her constitutional 
rights to travel because the father chooses not to exercise his. 
2. Right to Privacy and Right to Raise Children 
Courts have long held that there is a “private realm of family life which the 
state cannot enter.”229  Beginning in the early 1920s in Meyer v. Nebraska230 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,231 the Supreme Court has recognized a right of 
family privacy.232  Almost twenty years later, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Court read Meyer and Pierce as giving parents a fundamental due 
process right to determine the upbringing of their children,233 consistent with 
the Pierce holding that children “[are] not the mere creature[s] of the state; 
 
the geographical distance between the parents if the move is approved.  As Sheley points 
out, all change is disruptive, and a simple balancing of the status quo against the 
unknowns of the new location, particularly in light of the disruption already attendant to 
the separation and divorce, is likely to result in the undue sacrifice of the constitutional 
right to travel, often to the detriment of women, many of whom are financially devastated 
by divorce and, more often than men, in need of the opportunity to make a new economic 
start. 
Sheley, 895 P.2d at 850. 
 226. See, e.g., Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 227 (N.J. 2001) (“[I]t is not any effect on 
visitation, but an adverse effect that is pivotal.  An adverse effect is not a mere change or even a 
lessening of visitation; it is a change in visitation that will not allow the non-custodial parent to 
maintain his or her relationship with the child.”) (citation omitted). 
 227. Other states have required such an inquiry. Rampolla v. Rampolla, 635 A.2d 539, 543–
44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
 228. The most frequent type of commitments a mother may have to give up include 
employment opportunities, educational opportunities, ability to live near family, and remarriage. 
See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 229. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 230. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 231. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 232. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
 233. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.  
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those who nurture [them] and direct [their] destin[ies] have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [them] for additional 
obligations.”234  This right of parents to choose how to raise their children is 
grounded in the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and in an individual’s right to privacy.235 
Courts have held that the new family unit(s) created by divorce are entitled 
to the same amount of family privacy regarding their decisions as the intact 
family would have been given.236 
Accordingly, it is presumed that fit parents, married or divorced, act with 
the best interests of their children at heart.237  The mere fact that a court would 
make a different choice than a fit parent with regard to a child’s upbringing 
(whether that decision touches upon where a child should reside, what 
activities she should participate in, etc.) does not grant the court authority to 
take that decision-making power away from a parent; in other words, “[T]he 
Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental 
right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge 
believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”238 
Missouri courts undertake the Orwellian inquiry into whether the move 
should be allowed even in cases where the mother seeking to relocate has sole 
legal custody, or in other words, sole decision-making power over the child’s 
upbringing.239  For example, in Berkbigler, the court gave no credence to the 
fact that Ms. Berkbigler had recently been awarded sole decision-making 
 
 234. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
 235. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating the Fourteenth 
Amendment affords constitutional protection to personal decisions, including marriage, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Smith v. 
Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842–43 (1977) (stating the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects personal choice in matters of family life); Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“[F]reedom of personal choice . . . in family life 
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
 236. Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1993); Day v. LeBlanc, 610 So. 2d 42, 44 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Hill v. Hill, 548 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Osteraas v. 
Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 951 (Idaho 1993); In re Marriage of Branham, 617 N.E.2d 1317, 1322 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re Marriage of Pribble, 607 N.E.2d 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re 
Marriage of Zamarripa-Gesundheit, 529 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Smith v. Smith, 
615 So. 2d 926, 930–31 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Hemphill v. Hemphill, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689, 693 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Dobos v. Dobos, 431 S.E.2d 861, 863 (N.C. 1993); Fortin v. Fortin, 500 
N.W.2d 229, 231 (S.D. 1993); Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 332 (Tenn. 1993); Lane v. 
Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 790 (Vt. 1992). 
 237. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (citing Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584, 602 
(1979)). 
 238. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73.  
 239. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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authority by that very court.240  The father argued that the “[m]other cannot 
move wherever she chooses because she had legal custody of the child,” citing 
no authority for the statement, except that the relocation statute241 required that 
she show that the move was made in good faith and was in the best interest of 
the child.242 
But legal custody, by its very terms, must imply that a parent or guardian 
has the right to make decisions regarding a child’s upbringing, including 
decisions about health, education, religion, and welfare, unless a court 
concludes that a child’s physical health would be endangered or the child’s 
emotional development impaired without the limitation of the legal custodian’s 
authority.243  It seems axiomatic that if a parent has been allocated the 
authority to make such life-altering decisions, such as whether the child will 
undergo a major medical procedure, or be home-schooled rather than attend a 
public school, that parent could also retain the right to determine the child’s 
residence, so long as that decision does not “significantly and detrimentally” 
impinge on the other parent’s visitation time.244 
Missouri law allows the mere request to relocate to reopen a settled 
custody decision—exploring the best interest factors in excruciating detail—
simply because one parent claims the move may not serve the welfare of the 
child.  But as put by one Missouri court: 
There is no magic in [the] phrase, ‘welfare of the child,’ however.  It is no 
open sesame to unbridled judicial discretion; it is no talisman by which the 
court’s jurisdiction can be stretched beyond its limits . . . . The protection of 
the child’s welfare has indeed been the object of the courts in custody cases 
from earliest times; but the attainment of that object requires the observance of 
principles considerably more practical and less nebulous than a mere 
declaration of beneficent purpose.245 
Further, statutes that grant decision-making authority to custodial parents, and 
statutes that limit conduct by custodial parents that would “impinge” on a non-
custodial parent’s visitation time, are not at odds.  Statutes are not to be 
construed in a vacuum.246  When two statutes conflict when read together, 
courts should seek to harmonize them, giving effect to both to the extent it is 
possible.247  When reading § 452.377 (the relocation statute) together with § 
 
 240. Brief for Respondent at 15, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Oct. 
16, 2007), 2007 WL 3249950. 
 241. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.377.8. 
 242. Buchheit, Brief for Respondent, at 15.  
 243. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 452.375.2, 452.405.1. 
 244. See Salichs v. James, 268 A.D.2d 168, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
 245. Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370, 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). 
 246. Baxley v. Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192, 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (citing State ex rel. Riordan 
v. Dierker, 956 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. banc 1997)). 
 247. Id. 
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452.405 (the legal custodian statute), the most logical interpretation of the two 
would be to find that a relocation by a legal custodian occurring under § 
452.377 may only be prohibited where it is shown that the legal custodian’s 
decision about the change of residence would result in certain consequences.  
These consequences should require either: (1) endanger the child’s physical 
health; (2) impair the child’s emotional development; or (3) “significantly and 
detrimentally” interfere with the other parent’s visitation or custody time in a 
way that could not be salvaged by reallocating the visitation/custody periods 
and allocating transportation costs, pursuant to § 452.377.10.  This is the 
approach taken by several other states that have recognized that the court 
should only have the authority to constrain a move by a custodial parent when 
the move will substantially interfere with the non-custodial parent’s 
visitation.248  Missouri courts have long held that parents, rather than judges, 
should make major child-rearing choices because judges are ill-equipped to 
know the unique needs of the child.249  As the Court stated in Jenks: 
Courts are not so constituted as to be able to regulate the details of a child’s 
upbringing. It exhausts the imagination to speculate on the difficulties to which 
they would subject themselves were they to enter the home or the school or the 
playground and undertake to exercise on all occasions the authority which one 
party or the other would be bound to ascribe to them. . . . Thus, while the court 
ought continually to supervise the decisions of the custodian, it ought only 
rarely to dictate them. Any other policy will surely oblige the court to assume 
every responsibility which it denies to the custodian the discretion to 
discharge, and, in its farthest extension, substitute judicial paternalism for 
custodial responsibility.250 
 
 248. See, e.g., Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) 
(Pittman, J., concurring) (Limiting review of relocation disputes only in cases where the “planned 
relocation is to a place so geographically distant as to render weekly visitation impossible or 
impractical”); Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 227 (N.J. 2001).  Indeed at least one Missouri 
relocation cases has advocated this approach, but it has been overlooked in more recent cases.  In 
re Marriage of Mayfield, 780 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (“[R]emoval of the child 
from the jurisdiction should not be disallowed solely to maintain the existing visitation patterns.”) 
(citing In re Marriage of Dusing, 654 S.W.2d 938, 942–43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Auge v. Auge, 
334 N.W.2d 393, 397–99 (Minn. 1983);  D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 29 (N.J. Ch. 
1976). 
 249. See, e.g., Jenks, 385 S.W.2d at 377–78. 
 250. Id. at 377.  Although Jenks is an older case, it is still very much good law.  No Missouri 
case has overruled its proposition on this issue, and Jenks has been cited frequently by courts both 
within and without of Missouri for its proposition on this issue.  See e.g., Leahy v. Leahy, 858 
S.W.2d 221, 226 (Mo. 1993).  Further, one of the leading family law casebooks continues to use a 
discussion of Jenks’ reasoning as an illustration of the court’s proper role in acting as a “tie–
breaker” for parents who cannot agree.  See WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN, 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 1155 (6th ed. 2008). 
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Yet, more fundamentally at issue, is that the new family unit created by a 
couple’s divorce or separation should be entitled to the same amount of 
parental and individual autonomy and freedom from government intrusion into 
its child rearing decisions as are allotted to an intact family.251  When a trial 
court attempts to dictate to a fit custodial parent where the parent can create his 
or her residence, the court is not only “substituting judicial paternalism” for a 
parent’s reasoned judgment, it is infringing on that parent’s constitutional 
rights.252  As the Supreme Court held in Troxel, a trial court’s disagreement 
with a mother concerning what is in the child’s best interest is insufficient to 
override that parent’s rights to choose how to raise her child.253  As the Court 
explained, “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the 
fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a 
state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”254 
Currently, a father alone may choose to bar the exercise of the mother’s 
right, or he may do nothing and permit her relocation; the choice is his, and his 
alone when he is the objecting party.255  A father takes on the role of 
gatekeeper, deciding whether State intervention into the mother’s decision-
making will take place, while a custodial mother can only wait and hope that 
her former spouse or lover chooses not to invoke the heavy-handed power of 
state intervention.  Such a policy renders the State, at least in relocation 
disputes, as little more than an agent of the father, as the choice is solely his as 
to whether State involvement will be invoked.256 
As a New Jersey court put it, relocation restrictions which trap a woman in 
a geographic location near her child’s father are “consigning [her] for the next 
decade and a half to the immediate orbit of a man to whom she was briefly and 
unhappily married, to what [may be] for her an alien environment in which she 
has neither family nor professional ties, and to what would mean for her the 
sacrifice of her own professional, social and personal interests.”257 
The overwhelming amount of discretion granted to fathers might be 
compared to the spousal-consent deemed unconstitutional by the Casey court.  
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,258 the Supreme 
 
 251. See, e.g., Stephen v. Stephen, 937 P.2d 92, 99–100 (Okla. 1997). 
 252. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding 
that even where there is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of another race may be 
subjected to pressure and stress, it is insufficient to infringe upon a parent’s fundamental liberty 
interest); see also Stephen, 937 P.2d at 97 (“The trial court’s personal beliefs should not be forced 
on a custodial parent who has made a legitimate decision for the benefit of the minor children.”). 
 253. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63. 
 254. Id. at 72–73. 
 255. See LaFrance, supra note 54, at 92. 
 256. Id. at 93. 
 257. Helentjaris v. Sudano, 476 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). 
 258. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Court held that a burden on freedom of choice is “undue”—and therefore 
unconstitutional—when it deters women from exercising constitutionally 
protected choices.259  In Casey, one of the burdens was notifying a husband 
before getting an abortion;260 in the present case it is the burden of a mother 
potentially losing custody of her child to a former husband (or lover) as a 
consequence of her relocation.  In either instance, the burden may deter 
exercise of a fundamental right and deny due process.  The Casey Court held 
that marriage is an association of individuals and “[t]he Constitution protects 
individuals, men and women alike, from unjustified state interference, even 
when that interference is enacted into law for the benefit of their spouses.”261  
Further: 
  [A] husband’s interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying does not 
permit the State to empower him with this troubling degree of authority over 
his wife.  The contrary view leads to consequences reminiscent of the common 
law.  A husband has no enforceable right to require a wife to advise him before 
she exercises her personal choices. . . . A state may not give to a man the kind 
of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children.262 
Although Casey’s holding applies to a mother’s choice in bearing a child, a 
mother’s choice to relocate herself and her children to another geographical 
area continues to fall under Casey’s recognition of the privacy and primacy of 
a woman’s right to make choices about how to rear her children.  To hold that 
a mother’s liberty interest and decision-making concerning whether to bear her 
child (if at all) should be more highly valued than her right to decide where she 
can rear the very child she has borne would amount to an obvious absurdity, 
for it would be to effectively hold that a mother’s right to make decisions for 
herself and her child diminishes at precisely the time she needs more (rather 
than less) discretion over how to rear her children. 
As in the underlying facts of Casey, Missouri’s relocation statute gives a 
father veto power over many of a mother’s most basic, fundamental rights and 
personal decisions.  A father’s ability to prevent a mother’s relocation could 
possibly impinge on a mother’s right and ability to marry, should such a 
marriage involve a relocation on her part, and may even limit her ability to 
create a new, intact family for herself and her child.  If a father chooses not to 
object to a proposed relocation on the part of a mother, she is freely allowed to 
travel and relocate.  If a father chooses to prevent the relocation, he has all too 
often quashed any opportunity the mother had for a new life she felt was in the 
best interest of herself and her children.  Such authority not only results in the 
father oftentimes having ultimate control over whether a relocation is likely to 
 
 259. Id. at 895. 
 260. Id. at 838. 
 261. Id. at 896. 
 262. Id. at 898. 
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take place, but also grants him dominion over the exercise of a mother’s most 
basic and fundamental rights.263 
“The state registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates 
children from the custody of fit parents.”264  In Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland,265 the Court held that when a city attempted to restrict the right of a 
family to live together, “this Court must examine carefully the importance of 
the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by 
the challenged restriction.”266  If Missouri’s objective was to promote and 
preserve the best interests of the children of divorce who are facing relocation, 
then Missouri’s relocation laws seemingly do little to protect these interests.  
Missouri’s relocation law, however, does result in enormous fallout and 
damage to the families held captive to a geographical area by the whims of a 
mother’s former husband or lover.  The statute is also grossly underinclusive in 
meeting its purported interest, because the statute does not require parents to 
live in geographic proximity to each other.  Even when parents live great 
distances away from one another, courts have fashioned custody-sharing 
arrangements.  For example, the court has no authority to consider the 
relocation statute in an initial custody determination.267  Similarly, the non-
custodial parent can choose to move to a distant location at any time, no matter 
how difficult it will be for the children or for the other parent.268 
These interests are protected and promoted by the state to the exclusion of 
a mother’s new family, home or career, and all too often to the detriment of her 
family, husband, or children.  Upon attempting to relocate, a custodial mother 
can have every aspect of her decision-making questioned and probed by a 
court, her parenting examined, and the most intimate details of her life 
unearthed for review, and all at her former lover’s behest.  If there still exists a 
“private realm of family life which the state [should not] enter,” the decision 
 
 263. Id. at 851 (“Our laws afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education . . . These 
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 264. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). 
 265. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 266. Id. at 499. 
 267. Day ex. rel Finnern v. Day, 256 S.W.3d 600, 603, (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 268. “[A] noncustodial parent can relocate at will—without leave from or even providing 
notice to any court—no matter what impact relocation may have on the children or the ability of 
the custodial parent to fulfill parenting functions . . . No matter how [a father’s potential] 
relocation might affect [his children] emotionally, socially, or otherwise, no one suggests that [the 
mother] is entitled to seek a decree ordering her former husband to remain in Arkansas to 
continue his relationship with . . . the children . . . .”  Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 
856, 873 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). 
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concerning where to rear one’s children should most certainly be included 
within that realm. 
3. Right to Marry 
Remarriage is one of the most commonly asserted reasons for relocation.  
It is also common for a mother to request to relocate based on a new spouse’s 
employment transfer.  Missouri’s relocation law may prohibit parents from 
relocating to live with a new spouse—a prohibition that interferes with the 
parent and the new spouse’s constitutional right to marry. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic 
civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”269  The 
right to marry predates the Constitution and exists as a part of the liberty 
guaranteed by the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.270  Because the 
right to marry is fundamental, a state may only interfere with the right when it 
asserts a compelling state interest and assures that that interest is narrowly 
tailored. 
In Zablocki v. Redhail,271 the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin 
statute preventing any resident required to support minor children from getting 
married without showing that the support obligation was being paid and that 
the children were not likely to become public charges.  In so holding, the Court 
found the state did not show a “compelling state interest” or a means “narrowly 
tailored” because the statute in no way ensured that support money was being 
paid to children, and the state had other and more effective ways to ensure that 
children received financial support from their parents.272 
Zablocki’s reasoning applies to custody cases where a court forces a parent 
to forfeit custody of her child if she chooses to live with a new spouse.273  
Certainly if a state does not have a compelling state interest to restrict marriage 
to compel financial support for minor children, it is hard to imagine a state 
having a compelling interest to restrict marriage because the minor child needs 
regular contact with both parents; yet, that contact can be provided for by 
alternative visitation schedules and a reallocation of transportation costs. 
Although Missouri’s relocation law, unlike the law in Zablocki, does not 
directly prohibit a parent from obtaining a legal marriage, it can and does 
 
 269. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
541 (1942)). 
 270. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965);  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248 (1983); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 271. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 272. Id. at 395–96. 
 273. Several family law scholars have opined that relocation restrictions that hinder a 
woman’s right to marry and relocate to live with her new husband violate the mandate set forth in 
Zablocki v. Redhail. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 34, at 293–94 n.57. 
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prevent mothers from relocating to live with their new spouses.  Under 
Missouri law, the right to cohabit with a spouse is inherent in the fundamental 
right to marry.274  At a minimum, prohibiting a mother from relocating to live 
with her soon-to-be spouse unconstitutionally “chills the exercise” of the right 
to marry.  This is seen in many cases where mothers have delayed wedding 
plans pending the outcome of their relocation cases.275  In these situations, it is 
hard in many cases to even see a rational basis for denying a mother the right 
to relocate her residence to live with her new husband―which threatens to 
destroy an intact marriage and family for the sake of “preserving” a 
dysfunctional one.276 
A mother’s remarriage not only benefits the mother, but generally 
improves a child’s economic and emotional well-being.  Women who remarry 
increase the family income threefold and decrease the likelihood that their 
children will live in poverty.277  Stepfathers may also alleviate some of the 
child-rearing burdens placed on mothers: they may be available to share in 
supervising and transporting the children, help with homework, and 
communicate with the children.  In fact, recent research has shown that 
psychologically, children can benefit as much from a good relationship with a 
stepfather as they can with their biological father.278 
Select courts have recognized the moral bankruptcy in requiring a parent to 
literally choose between her new spouse and her child.  For example, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s and appellate court’s ruling 
that refused to allow the custodial mother to move to Arizona with her son, to 
join her new husband there.279  There, the trial court found that the mother was 
better suited to be residential parent, but still disallowed her move.280  The 
court held Nebraska would not force a custodial parent to make such a choice 
between her son and her spouse.281  Similarly, in criticizing an Arkansas trial 
court’s holding that denied a mother the right to relocate to live with her new 
spouse, an Arkansas appellate judge noted: 
 
 274. Komosa v. Komosa, 939 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
 275. See notes 211–20 and accompanying text (discussing a case with similar circumstances). 
 276. See Bruch, supra note 34, at 293–94 n.57. 
 277. See MARY ANN MASON, THE MODERN AMERICAN STEPFAMILY: PROBLEMS AND 
POSSIBILITIES, in ALL OUR FAMILY: NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY 100–01 (Mary Ann 
Mason, et al. eds., 2003); Christine Bachrach, Children in Families: Characteristics of 
Biological, Step-, and Adopted Children, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 171, 176 (1983) (stating that 
almost 49% of children living with a single mother are living below the poverty line, in contrast 
to 8% of children who live with a mother and step-father). 
 278. Lynn White & Joan G. Gilbreth, When Children Have Two Fathers: Effects of 
Relationships with Stepfathers and Noncustodial Fathers on Adolescent Outcomes, 63 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 155, 160 (2001). 
 279. Harder v. Harder, 524 N.W.2d 325, 329–30 (Neb. 1994). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id.  
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One would ordinarily think that courts encourage marriage.  After all, judges 
and other officiants at marriage ceremonies profess that marriage is an 
honorable estate.  I know of no caveat that holds remarriage to be less 
honorable or less worthy of affirmation. . . . So it is more than a little strange 
that the law would essentially penalize a custodial parent who takes the 
honorable step of marriage following divorce if remarriage carries the prospect 
of life outside [the state].282 
D. Pervasive Bias 
There is ample reason to believe that much of the reluctance to allow 
mothers to relocate with their children comes from an inherent bias in the 
judiciary.283  The best interest standard, standing alone, has been criticized as 
being unduly vague.284  As a consequence, judges often rely on their own life 
experiences and biases in making rulings.285  Precisely because the standards 
are vague, it is easy for judges to hide potentially irrelevant, sexist, or 
geographical biases and substitute their own values for those of the 
legislature.286  In multiple studies, judges have admitted to not complying with 
state statutes or precedent when making custody decisions.287  Often the trial 
court will fail to even “make findings of fact, to write an opinion, or to 
reconcile the case with precedent.”288  When judges are given virtually 
unbridled discretion to decide child custody disputes, and in turn use that 
 
 282. Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (Griffen J., 
concurring). 
 283. See infra notes 324–94 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 185–210 and accompanying text (criticizing the best interests test as 
vague, biased, and unworkable in practice). 
 285. See, e.g., Robert E. Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations: 
Limited Science and a Flawed System, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1 (2005); Jeff Atkinson, 
Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 16 (1984) 
(Custody decisions are often determined by what is “in the heart of the trial judge(s)”); Susan 
Beth Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard in 
Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 849 (1997); Charlow, supra note 107, at 271; 
Duggan, supra note 44, at 195, (stating that judges “kid [themselves] if [they] think [they] are 
applying some value-neutral best interest standard instead of one based on [their] own prejudices 
and biases”); Sheehan, supra note 177, at 138; Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: 
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 257–62 
(1975); Judith A. Fournie, Note, Post-Divorce Visitation: A Study in the Deprivation of Rights, 27 
DEPAUL L. REV. 113, 113 (1977); Pfenning, supra note 180, at 118–19, 124. 
 286. Id. at 272–73; Pastis, supra note 45, at 420. 
 287. Charlow, supra note 107, at 272; see also Pfenning, supra note 181, at 119 (reviewing 
decisions from multiple jurisdictions and arguing that judges do not always follow legal mandates 
when deciding child custody actions). 
 288. Pastis, supra note 45, at 425 (citing Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: 
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 253–54 
(1975)). 
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discretion to subvert the legislature’s intent, statutes that were created to 
protect children might end up harming them.289 
1. Gender Bias 
Relocation jurisprudence has been hailed as a critical women’s legal 
issue.290  In many cases, the decisions often appear to be based on outmoded 
stereotypes of what a “good mother” is supposed to look like.291  Both 
anecdotal reports and reports from task forces in various states show that 
gender bias is a problem in both relocation cases and other child custody 
decisions.292  Some have called it a “nationwide backlash of [gender] 
discrimination” disguised by the best interest standard.293 
For an example of this bias, consider one court that “applaud[ed the 
mother’s] efforts to be upwardly mobile economically, and [found] her efforts 
at job improvement count[ed] to her advantage as a role model,” but 
nevertheless denied her petition to relocate.294  Such career-seeking moves 
were often seen to be in conflict with the child’s overall well-being.295  Nor are 
moves by a mother in order to attend college, obtain a graduate degree, or enter 
a specialized education program often viewed favorably by judges.296  
Missouri judges fared no better in anecdotal reports published by the Missouri 
Task Force on Gender and Justice.  As the director of the Missouri Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence testified, “There are often inappropriate comments 
and belittling behaviors that occur within the courtroom from the bench.”297  
Custody decisions show that “mothers are losing custody as a result of . . . 
inappropriate criteria caused by gender bias unrelated to the best interest of the 
child.”298 
 
 289. See Pfenning, supra note 180, at 119. 
 290. Ford, supra note 69, at 1; see generally Pastis, supra note 45 (arguing that restricting the 
mobility of custodial parents is a form of sex-based discrimination). 
 291. Jacobs, supra note 285, at 868 (1997). 
 292. Sheehan, supra note 177, at 135 (stating that child custody laws reinforce stereotypical 
gender roles in families). 
 293. Jacobs, supra note 285, at 848–49 (quoting Laurie Woods et al., Sex and Economic 
Discrimination in Child Custody Awards, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1130 (1983)). 
 294. Glennon, supra note 38, at 129 (quoting Fields v. Fields, 749 N.E.2d 100, 109 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2001)). 
 295. Id. at 129–30. 
 296. Glennon, supra note 38, at 135–36. 
 297. Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 505. 
 298. Jacobs, Nancy D. Polikoff, Why are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used 
in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 235, 236 (1982); Richmond v. 
Tecklenberg, 396 S.E.2d 111 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990); Anderson v. Anderson, 472 N.W.2d 519 
(S.D. 1991). 
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Even when relocation standards are applied evenhandedly, they often have 
a disparate effect upon women.299  One reason for criticism is that focusing on 
objective criteria tends to obscure the less quantifiable psychological aspects of 
relocation—judges overemphasize quantifiable factors such as an increase in 
income and ignore the more personal factors such as a need to start over or to 
get remarried.300  And if the economic positions of the parties are compared, 
“women are likely to be disadvantaged.”301 
Restraining women in their movement invokes criticism because it allows 
for men’s domination of women even after a marriage has ended, particularly 
in relocation cases where implicit notions of appropriate gender roles often 
influence judicial decisions.302  Overall, “residence restrictions are sex-based in 
their application, justification, and effect because they exist to protect only the 
interests of the noncustodial father.”303 
2. Status Quo Bias 
Studies indicate that, generally, judges do not like deciding family law 
cases.304  Judges may dislike having to upset the status quo and often become 
impatient when family law attorneys appear frequently before the court to 
secure their clients’ rights.305  As a result, judges are inclined to find that 
preserving the status quo is the best way to preserve the best interests of the 
child.306  The difficulty inherent in deciding whether children should be 
relocated encourages judges to avoid the consequences of a potential 
decisional error by preserving the custody arrangement the way it is and by 
forcing the mother to make the difficult choice of whether she should stay or 
go.307  This type of decision avoidance has been called “choice deferral.”308  
 
 299. Sheehan, supra note 176, at 138 (arguing that they cause disparate economic effects); 
Pastis, supra note 45, at 420 (arguing that they give father veto power over the mother).  
 300. Sheehan, supra note 176, at 138. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 135, 136 (citing Fran Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1984)). 
 303. Pastis, supra note 45, at 421 (“If most custodial parents were men, residence restrictions 
would cease to exist or would be analyzed differently; the focus would finally be on the real 
interests at stake for all involved.”). 
 304. One judge complained that “[he] would rather send someone to life in the penitentiary” 
than decide a child custody case.  Charlow, supra note 107, at 272 (citing Jessica Pearson & 
Maria A. Luchesi-Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703 
(1982–83)); see also Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 537–39 (reporting that 
Missouri judges have negative attitudes toward family law, believe it to be lower-status work, and 
often dislike deciding private family matters). 
 305. See Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 539. 
 306. See Marie Eyre et al., Decision Inertia: The Impact of Organizations on Critical Incident 
Decision-Making, in POLICING CRITICAL INCIDENTS: LEADERSHIP AND CRITICAL INCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT 207 (Laurence Alison & Jonathan Crego, eds., 2008). 
 307. Id.  
 308. Id. at 208. 
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Psychologically, people are inclined “to weigh potential losses more than 
potential gains in the same amount.”309  To explain, when faced with the 
choice between potential harm to the child associated with moving to a distant 
location and the potential improvements that a move may bring to a child’s 
life, judges may seek to minimize the harm to the child, rather than maximize 
the gain.  Judges avoid the guilt they could potentially incur as a result of their 
actions by merely declining to act.310  This overly simplistic thinking, however, 
fails to account for the harm both the mother and the child may face by 
suffering through prolonged litigation and sacrificing important goals. 
3. Nuclear Family Bias 
Family law has often intruded into people’s most important life choices.  
Divorced and never-married parents have to justify decisions in a way that 
would never be required of intact families.  For example, it is likely that no one 
would question an intact family’s decision to relocate for a job opportunity 
even if there was clear evidence that the relocation would have detrimental 
effects on the child.  The reasons for the nuclear family bias are unclear.  Is it 
that only children of divorce or out-of-wedlock relationships are worth 
protecting?  Is it that only married parents are capable of making good choices 
for how to raise their children? 
Judge Duggan has criticized the adversarial custody system as taking 
power away from parents.311  As he explains, “They’re their kids—the parents 
should decide what’s best . . . our goal should be to empower parents and assist 
them in reaching decisions that are in their children’s best interest.  Instead, at 
every step, we disempower them.”312 
In In re the Marriage of Burgess, the court came closer to this ideal when 
it refused to allow trial courts to “‘micromanage’. . . everyday decisions about 
career and family.”313  We presume that parents in intact families “[make] the 
decision to move with the best interests of their children in mind.”314  There is 
no reason why the same should not hold true when a mother in a post-divorce 
family decides to move since the awarding of custody to the mother has 
created a new family unit, and an initial court proceeding found the mother to 
be the best custodian to protect the child’s interests.315  As some have 
observed, “There is no greater need for the court to substitute its judgment of 
 
 309. Id. 
 310. See id. 
 311. Duggan, supra note 44, at 193. 
 312. Id. at 196. 
 313. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 481 (Cal. 1996). 
 314. Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 445; Pastis, supra note 45, at 431; Richard F. Storrow, 
The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families in American 
Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527, 618 (2001). 
 315. Pastis, supra note 45, at 431. 
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what will serve the best interests of the child in the post-divorce family unit 
than in the traditional family setting.”316  Allowing judicial inquiry into the 
decisions of the custodial parent only serves to destabilize a new family unit 
and encourage hostility between the two parents.317 
Some courts have created a more reasoned response to a parent’s request to 
relocate: they have recognized that divorce alters the relationship between 
children and their parents and that it is unrealistic to pretend that a broken 
family will continue to live as if the family is still intact.318  As the Connecticut 
Supreme Court wrote, “It may not be realistic to try to preserve completely the 
quality and nature of the relationship that the noncustodial parent enjoyed with 
the child, especially if such preservation is maintained at the cost of the 
custodial parent’s ability to start a new, potentially improved life for herself or 
himself and the child.”319 
4. Economic Bias 
The price tag of litigating relocation disputes, coupled with the uncertainty 
of succeeding, is likely a significant enough deterrent to prevent women from 
attempting to move if they suspect the non-custodial parent would object.320  
Consider the case of the domestic violence victim, Deb,321 who was a 
successful businesswoman.322  In the course of the litigation, she was forced to 
quit work, enroll in welfare, and pay over $15,000 for psychological 
evaluations—not including the costs of her son’s weekly therapy sessions.323  
By the time her case was over, “she owe[d] her family law attorney $50,000, 
owe[d] her parents $50,000, and file[d] for bankruptcy.”324  Because men are 
generally in a better financial situation than women after divorce,325 men can 
sometimes use the cost of litigation as a weapon to oppress women’s legal 
rights.  This is sometimes termed “winning by financial attrition.”326 
 
 316. Id. 
 317. Ford, supra note 69, at 19 (citing Barbara E. Handschu, Revolution in Relocation Law, 
N.Y. L.J., May 17, 1996, at 1). 
 318. See, e.g., Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 681 (Conn. 1998); D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 
365 A.2d 27, 29-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). 
 319. Ireland, 717 A.2d at 681. 
 320. See Sheehan, supra note 176, at 139, 144. 
 321. See supra notes 136–53 and accompanying text. 
 322. Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 435. 
 323. Id. at 434–35. 
 324. Id. at 435. 
 325. “[T]he average divorced man can earn as much as the couple’s entire net worth in only 
ten months after the divorce.”  Kathryn E. Abare, Note, Protecting the New Family: Ireland v. 
Ireland and Connecticut’s Custodial Parent Relocation Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 307, 324 (1999) 
(citing SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 163 (1989)). 
 326. Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 535. 
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The cost of divorce often leaves women in dire economic straits.327  
Women are disadvantaged financially for a number of reasons, but often it is 
because they have taken time out of the labor force to raise children and 
perform household labor.328  The first year after divorce, a woman with 
children is likely to see a 73% decrease in her standard of living.329  
Immediately after divorce, poor mothers are often forced by economics to 
move frequently—on average seven times within the first six years of 
divorce.330 
Justice Wendell Griffen, writing for the Arkansas appellate court in 
Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, recognized the increased difficulties women face 
post-divorce and explained that the difficulties are directly related to women’s 
reasons for relocation: 
Our society has long practiced a double standard regarding social freedom and 
gender. . . .  [M]en are unentitled beneficiaries of greater social, economic, and 
cultural freedom than women who, for reasons largely due to gender, labor 
under greater social, economic, and cultural burdens when they try to exercise 
freedoms men often take for granted. Men are less likely to encounter social 
ostracism than women after divorce, no matter the reason for divorce. They are 
less prone to encounter discrimination on account of their gender in the 
workplace, whether they are custodial parents or not. . . .  [T]hroughout 
American society, men earn decisively more money than women, even when 
performing the same work.  Thus, the social, economic, and cultural forces that 
might influence a divorced woman to relocate to another state usually will not 
affect men the same way. . . .  I cannot ignore the gender-specific 
consequences it portends.331 
Restricting women from opportunities that will provide them better jobs, 
further their education, or allow them to remarry increases the likelihood that 
women will end up in poverty.332  Such relocation policies that restrict the 
opportunities of women are unwise.  Author Ann Crittenden tells of a 
 
 327. ALLISON CLARKE-STEWART & CORNELIA BRENTANO, DIVORCE: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 97 (2006). 
 328. Id. at 200.  Taking time out of the labor force can prevent them from getting raises, 
decrease their retirement savings, and make them less employable when they decide to reenter the 
workforce.  Id. at 200–02.  Even when women remain in the workforce, they often are required to 
work part time or take flexible employment, or take more time off of work to meet their child-
rearing obligations.  Id. at 112, 200.  
 329. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, 
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 19 (1989) (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, 
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 323 (1985)). 
 330. HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 88. 
 331. Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 874 (Ark. 2002). 
 332. See CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 328, at 97 (discussing a study of sixty 
middle-class women after divorce, finding that most women struggled to survive economically 
and two years after the divorce, 85% did not recover economically.  
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conversation she had with Lawrence Summers, a distinguished economist, 
former president of Harvard, and newly appointed head of the White House 
Economic Council, where he explained that “[r]aising children is the most 
important job in the world.”333  This is so because in today’s economy, two-
thirds of the world’s wealth is created by “human capital”: the skills, creativity, 
and enterprise of humans.334  As economist Shirley Burggraf explained, this 
means that parents rearing their children are “the major wealth producers in 
our economy.”335  But to properly support and raise children, mothers require a 
stable and secure income. 
Judicial policies that inhibit women’s plights to seek better lives for 
themselves and their children through higher education, a better job 
opportunity, or remarriage virtually ensure that women have little opportunity 
to escape a perilous, semi-dependent economic status.  Rather, states should 
encourage mothers to seek post-secondary education and certainly not penalize 
them if they seek to relocate to obtain a college degree or further education or 
employment opportunities.  The benefits for both the mother and the children 
are profound.  Women’s salaries dramatically increase with college degrees, 
degrees reduce mothers’ likelihood of being poor by about fifteen percent, and 
degrees help insulate women from economic downturns.336  College education 
also increases mothers’ expectations of their children’s achievement, 
encourage children’s own educational aspirations, and correlate with early 
development of literacy skills in children—which increases the likelihood the 
children will be successful in school.337 
E. Contingent Custody Transfers 
Usually when judges deny a relocation request, they order what is called a 
“contingent custody transfer,” which is a conditional order where the non-
custodial parent (usually father) is awarded physical custody of the children if, 
and only if, the custodial parent (usually mother) chooses to relocate.338  This 
type of order is effectively “judicial blackmail”—the purpose is to strong-arm 
the custodial parent, likely the mother, into abandoning the move and 
 
 333. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN 
THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 2 (2001). 
 334. Id.  
 335. Id. (quoting SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MAN 64 
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 336. Peggy Kahn et al., Introduction, in SHUT OUT: LOW INCOME MOTHERS AND HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN POST-WELFARE AMERICA 1, 9 (Valerie Polakow et al. eds., 2004). 
 337. Id. 
 338. Bruch, supra note 34, at 284; Caroline Ritchie Heil, Comment, Relocation Cases as 
Change in Custody Proceedings: “Judicial Blackmail,” or Competing Interests Reconciled?, 51 
S.C. L. REV. 885, 896 (2000).  
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maintaining the status quo.339  Most of the time judges make these orders 
expecting the custodial parent to abandon the move, and as a result, judges 
enter the order without considering whether it would be more harmful for the 
child to change custody than it would be for the child to relocate with the 
custodial parent.340 
At times the custodial parent, likely the mother, may have no choice but to 
move.  In those circumstances, the conditional custody transfer makes no 
sense―the child will still have to move, but the move will be into the home of 
the non-custodial parent rather than relocating with the custodial parent.341  
Not only is the child faced with the detrimental effects of a move, but the child 
also faces the loss of his or her primary caretaker.342 
If the parent “chooses” not to relocate, however, he or she may retain the 
status quo and keep custody of the child.  For most parents, usually mothers, 
that “choice” is not really a choice at all. 343  Commentators have called 
decisions such as these a “Sophie’s Choice,” referring to the the William 
Styron novel of that name that chronicles the lead character’s forced decision 
in a Nazi concentration camp to choose which one of her two children would 
live and which would die.344  Judges may fail to consider the collateral damage 
such “choices” may cause.  Mothers who give up significant life opportunities 
often become depressed and resentful for their “grievous loss.”345  Children 
can often sense their mother’s anguish resulting from the lost opportunity and 
may become emotionally disturbed as a result.346  Tensions between the 
warring parents often get worse, not better, following the end of the relocation 
trial.347  As a result, children may receive diminished parenting.348  Yet, as Ann 
 
 339. Bruch, supra note 34, at 284–85. 
 340. Id.; see also In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81, 102 (Cal. 2004) (Kennard, J., 
dissenting); In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 481, n.7 (Cal. 1996). 
 341. Bruch, supra note 34, at 284. 
 342. Id. 
 343. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 39. 
 344. Id. at 9 n.49; see also Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 792 (Vt. 1992) (using the term 
“Sophie’s choice” to describe the mother’s dilemma). 
 345. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 315. 
 346. Consider the letter sent to Judith Wallerstein and attached as Appendix A to her Amicus 
Brief.  Brief for Tony J. Tanke as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 88, at 
Appendix A, 1.  There, a mother who was initially forced to give up her dream to go to medical 
school reported that her seven-year-old daughter “repeatedly asked [her] if [she] was going to 
leave [the daughter] to go to medical school” and as a result began having nightmares and chronic 
stomachaches.  Id.  The child’s pediatrician explained to the mother that the child’s medical 
issues derived from her anguish that the mother might choose to go to medical school without 
taking her.  Id. 
 347. Valdespino, supra note 99, at 22. 
 348. Id.; see also Bruch, supra note 34, at 287 (citing Judith S. Wallerstein & Julia M. Lewis, 
The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: Report of a 25-Year Study, 21 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 
353, 359 (2004)) (“[S]tressed-out parents provide . . . ‘seriously diminished parenting.’”). 
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Crittenden argues, “It isn’t fair to expect mothers to make sacrifices that no 
one else is asked to make, or have virtues that no one else possesses, such as a 
dignified subordination of their personal agenda and a reliance on altruism for 
life’s meaning.”349  In fact, “Virtues and sacrifices, when expected of one 
group of people and not of everyone, become the mark of an underclass.”350 
Other states, such as the Vermont Supreme Court, have disallowed the use 
of conditional custody transfers to regulate the choices of custodial parents.351 
Missouri should follow the lead of other states by finding that conditional 
orders may not be used to “blackmail” a mother into abandoning her relocation 
plans. 
IV.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
One author has argued that “[g]iven the existing patchwork of state laws 
and the peripatetic nature of contemporary society, any effort to impose strict 
limits on the movement of parties post-divorce seems naïve at best, 
unconstitutional at worst, and doomed to almost certain failure in any 
event.”352  Missouri’s archaic relocation laws, based on unrealistic notions 
about post-divorce life, are in need of serious revision. 
Family law scholars have long argued that child custody decisions, 
including relocation decisions, should be governed by a set of objective 
standards that would minimize potential bias, while still allowing judges a 
certain level of discretion.353  Scholars have proposed a wide variety of 
solutions to the problem, but no plan has received widespread support from 
courts or legislatures.354  Because relocation decisions are necessarily fact-
specific, some scholars question the likelihood that “any specific test or 
standard can do justice” in complex relocation decisions. 
This proposal attempts to shelter a mother’s interests in seeking a new life 
in a new location, while protecting a father’s right to have realistic visitation 
with his child and still allow the courts to bar relocation when it would 
endanger a child.  The proposal recognizes the importance of maintaining a 
positive father-child relationship but also recognizes that this can usually be 
accomplished through creative visitation schedules and proactive 
communication, rather than through an outright prohibition on a mother’s right 
to relocate.  This proposal attempts to be both objective and discretionary and 
 
 349. CRITTENDEN, supra note 333, at 9. 
 350. Id. 
 351. See, e.g., Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 790 (Vt. 1992). 
 352. Barry Scholl, Note, A Matter the Court Should Consider?: The Risk of Relocation and 
the Custody Conundrum, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 353, 358–59 (2004). 
 353. See Pfenning, supra note 180, at 129. 
 354. See, e.g., id. at 128–29 (suggesting custody decisions should be decided by a three-judge 
panel instead of by one trial judge to minimize bias). 
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takes into account many important factors discussed in court opinions, legal 
scholarship, and psychological research. 
A. Missouri Should Modify the Burden of Proof and the Statutory Scheme for 
Considering Relocations 
In Missouri, the relocating parent has the burden of proving that the move 
is in the best interest of the child.355  Missouri should transpose its burden of 
proof, allowing a primary custodial parent to move (without judicial 
intervention) unless the non-relocating parent files a motion to prevent 
relocation and proves that the move is not in the best interests of the child. 
If the non-custodial parent files a motion to prevent relocation, the court 
should decide the case based on a four-step burden-shifting standard.  First, the 
judge should require the relocating parent to prove that the relocation request is 
made in good faith.  If the judge finds that the relocation request is not made in 
good faith, and is instead an attempt to alienate the non-custodial parent or 
frustrate visitation, then the court should presumptively deny the relocation 
request, ending the analysis. 356  If the court, however, finds that the parent’s 
request was made in good faith, it would proceed to step two—determining the 
best interest of the child. 
In step two, the non-relocating parent has the burden of proving that the 
move is not in the best interest of the child.  Rather than allowing the judge 
unfettered discretion in applying an amorphous “best interests” test, the judge 
would be required to complete a judicial form that lists the relevant factors to 
be weighed in a relocation dispute.357  The form would have a series of 
statements regarding the relocation request, and the judge could answer by 
indicating whether, in the context of that specific case, he strongly agreed; 
agreed; felt neutral; disagreed; or strongly disagreed with the statement.  He 
would also have the option of discarding questions that were not applicable to 
the current situation.  On certain factors, the judge could also indicate the level 
of importance the factor had in the present dispute; thus judges would be less 
likely to overemphasize any one factor.  When the form was completed, the 
judge’s responses would be calculated, and the score of the calculation would 
indicate whether the move would fall in one of three potential categories: 
“would likely be in the child’s best interest,” “may or may not be in the child’s 
best interest,” or “likely would not be in the child’s best interest.” 
If the resulting calculation indicates that the move “would likely be in the 
best interests of the child,” it creates a rebuttable presumption that the move 
should be allowed unless the judge rebuts the form by showing that either (1) 
the presumption was unjust or improper because it did not adequately reflect 
 
 355. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.9 (2002). 
 356. See, e.g., Valdespino, supra note 99, at 22.   
 357. See Appendix A, for a suggestion of forms for a court to use in relocation cases.  
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the best interests of the child, or (2) that the move would endanger the child’s 
health or welfare. 
If the calculation indicates that the move “may or may not be in the best 
interests of the child,” it would also create a rebuttable presumption that the 
move should be allowed, unless the judge rebuts the form.  This is because the 
custodial parent has already been chosen as the primary caretaker, and the law 
should aim to protect the child’s relationship with its primary caretaker and 
preserve the stability of the original custody determination. 
If the calculation indicates that the move would likely not be in the child’s 
best interest, the court would be required to make an additional ruling under 
step three of the analysis.  In step three, the judge would be required to 
consider which alternative would be the least detrimental to the child.  If the 
move, although problematic, would be a better alternative because it would 
allow the child to remain in the custody of the primary custodial parent, then 
the move should be allowed.  In contrast, if a child would be better served by 
living with the non-custodial parent than relocating with the custodial parent, 
the move should be denied.  In effect, the court is deciding whether the child 
would be better served by moving with the custodial parent or staying with the 
non-custodial parent.358 
Additionally, if a judge is unsatisfied that the form has reached the correct 
result, he may rebut the form in step four, after completing the form and the 
subsequent analysis.359  If the judge rebuts the form, he should make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law explaining why a deviation from the form would 
be in the child’s best interests.  This analysis helps preserve the reasoning 
behind the judge’s decision to allow or deny the move and focuses the judge 
on the factors that should be most important in relocation disputes. 
If the relocation is allowed, the court should fashion a visitation schedule 
that will allow the non-custodial parent a realistic opportunity for contact with 
the child.  The court should also consider implementing the use of technology 
to foster the child’s relationship with the non-custodial parent.360  As the 
Missouri Court of Appeals has held in the past, “in this age of high speed 
travel and common use of communication technology,” parties can discuss the 
child’s needs and resolve those needs as effectively as they could if the parents 
lived in the same city.361 
 
 358. See Charles Bauer, Relocation of Children After Divorce, ADVOCATE, Jun. 2001, at 12, 
13 (citing Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 495–96 (Vt. 1992)). 
 359. Such rebuttable presumptions create continuity in decision-making while recognizing 
that any situation will likely have “outliers” that do not quite fit in a general scheme. Allowing 
the court to rebut the presumption when atypical circumstances arise allows for some flexibility 
in unique circumstances.  See Bruch, supra note 34, at 294. 
 360. See, e.g., Gottfried, supra note 37, at 475.  
 361. McCubbin v. Taylor, 5 S.W.3d 202, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
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This reversal of the burden of proof in relocation cases incorporates three 
major legal doctrines at play in child-custody disputes—doctrines that seek to 
preserve the continuity and stability of a child’s relationship with his or her 
custodial parent: (1) that it is generally in the child’s best interests to preserve 
the status quo regarding custody placement; (2) that there is generally a 
presumption that physical custody should be awarded to the “primary 
caretaker” of the child; and (3) that custody placements should only be 
modified upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances.362 
B. Missouri Should Explicitly Define “Good Faith” as Used in Relocation 
Disputes as a “Lack of Bad Faith” 
When courts determine whether the custodial parent is seeking to move in 
“good faith,” they should not, at that point, be determining whether the reasons 
for moving are in the child’s best interest.363  Instead, they should be deciding 
whether the reasons for moving are legitimate, and not made in “bad faith.”364 
Courts, however, should be mindful that in some situations, a parent’s 
desire to distance himself or herself from an ex-spouse or ex-lover does not 
necessarily indicate that she is acting in bad faith.365  The need to “start a new 
life” away from bad memories and friends, who only knew the parent as part of 
a couple, can be compelling.366  Often women have moved away from their 
homes and families to a new location determined by the father’s 
employment.367  After the demise of the relationship, there may be no real 
reason for the mother to continue to live near the father, apart from her own 
family, who could provide a necessary support system after divorce.368  Putting 
distance between a high-conflict mother and father can often lessen the 
frequency and intensity of the conflict.369  Courts should seek to separate these 
legitimate reasons for moving from situations where the move is intended 
solely to interfere with a father’s visitation, or a tactic to harass or annoy him.  
In determining whether a custodial parent is acting in good faith, the court 
should not interrogate whether the parent’s reasons for moving are good or bad 
 
 362. See Bruch, supra note 34, at 286. 
 363. See Paige M. Dempsey, Note, Joint Custody and Relocation: The Supreme Court of 
Nebraska Limits Relocation of Parents Sharing Joint Custody in Brown v. Brown, 35 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 211–12 (2001) (citing Jack v. Clinton, 609 N.W.2d 328 (Neb. 2000)) 
(discussing how the Nebraska Supreme Court differentiated between a “legitimate” reason for a 
move from that reason meeting the child’s best interest). 
 364. Id. 
 365. See Sheehan, supra note 176, at 141. 
 366. Id. at 141–42 (noting that a woman’s identity may be partially derived from her 
husband’s). 
 367. Id. at 141. 
 368. Id. 
 369. See supra notes 366–67 and accompanying text. 
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reasons.  Instead, the court should consider only whether the parent’s reasons 
are a “pretext” for a vindictive motive. 
In addition, the court should fashion a remedy for custodial parents who 
have spent time and money litigating the relocation if the non-custodial parent 
has objected in bad faith.  At least one legislative proposal in Missouri has 
sought to give custodial parents the opportunity to seek attorneys’ fees from a 
non-custodial parent who objects to the relocation in bad faith.370 
C. Missouri Should Change the Definition of Relocation to Allow Parents to 
Move Short Distances without Seeking Judicial Intervention 
Under current Missouri law, custodial parents have to seek permission to 
move for any move, no matter how close or far away.371  The better practice 
would be to define relocation as a fixed number of miles (for example, 150 
miles) away from the previous residence.  This definition would conform with 
sound jurisprudence which holds that moves within a reasonable distance 
should not be deemed a substantial change in circumstances that would trigger 
a modification in custody.372 
Under this new system, if a parent sought to move within the 150-mile 
boundary, he or she would still be required to send notice to the non-relocating 
parent, advising them of the move, but would not be required to seek 
permission from the non-custodial parent or court before they could move.  If 
other circumstances besides those generally associated with relocation373 have 
changed substantially, the non-relocating parent could seek a modification of 
custody.  This change in definition would prevent mothers like Ms. Osiafrom 
spending thousands of dollars and waiting several years just to be able to move 
a short distance away. 
D. Missouri Should Create Evidentiary Rules which Would Prohibit Courts 
from Forcing Parents to Prove Things They Cannot or Should Not Have 
to Prove 
Courts should create evidentiary rules that restrain non-relocating parents 
from attacking the relocating parent’s motives for the move based on evidence 
 
 370. H.B. 1421, 90th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000), available at 
http://www.house.mo.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills00/biltxt00/intro00/HB1421I.htm. 
 371. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 452.377.1, 452.410, 452.411 (2002 & Supp. 2008). 
 372. See note 58 and accompanying text (citing statutes and cases where other states allow 
relocations a short distance away, and proposed bills seeking to change Missouri’s law 
accordingly); see also, e.g., Williams, 230 S.W.3d at 861 (allowing mother’s move because it was 
only fifty-five miles away and that it would be unrealistic to inflexibly confine her to a 
geographic area, even though the move was across state lines). 
 373. Courts should not consider factors generally associated with relocation such as a change 
in residence, a change in neighborhood, a change in school, etc. as a change in circumstances to 
justify a modification of custody. 
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that the relocating parent has failed to obtain an exact address, the exact school 
or daycare the children will attend, or even a firm offer of employment, if a 
contingent employment offer appears reasonably calculated to lead to gainful 
employment.  Certainly courts should discourage moves where the custodial 
parents have failed to undertake any investigation into the new living 
arrangements and schools.  But if a parent comes to court and can offer 
evidence that, if allowed to move, she would likely live in a certain 
neighborhood and her children would likely attend a certain school, she should 
not be penalized for her inability to finalize housing or schooling due to the 
speculative nature of relocation.  Further, the absence of this evidence should 
have little bearing on the outcome of the case because the trial court has 
already deemed the custodial parent the more suitable caretaker of the child.  
Courts should presume that the custodial parent will act in the child’s best 
interest in choosing housing and making child care and educational decisions.  
Absent evidence that a particular location will directly harm a child, this type 
of evidence is likely irrelevant and unnecessary to an informed relocation 
decision. 
Courts should also limit the ability of custodial parents or non-custodial 
parents to introduce general statistical evidence about the safety of the city or 
the “quality” of a city’s schools without first requiring the parent to make an 
offer of proof that the evidence would, more likely than not, have a substantial 
and observable effect on a child’s actual development.374 
Finally, courts should prohibit parents from introducing evidence 
indicating whether a custodial parent would in fact move if the court denies the 
relocation.375  Barring the introduction of this type of evidence is one further 
step in limiting the ability of judges to grant contingent custody transfers and 
to force a mother to make the “Sophie’s choice” of relocating or losing custody 
of her child.376 
E. Missouri Should Allow Parents with an Imminent Need to Relocate an 
Opportunity for a Preliminary Hearing 
The trial court should allow a custodial parent to have a preliminary 
hearing377 concerning the move if (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the 
 
 374. See infra notes 377–84 and accompanying text.  
 375. PROPOSED MODEL RELOCATION ACT § 406(b) (Am. Acad. Matrim. Lawyers 1997), 
available at http://www.aaml.org/tasks/sites/default/assets/File/docs/publications/Model_ 
Relocation_Act.htm; Duggan, supra note 44, at 206 (advocating that this type of evidence be 
excluded). 
 376. See Duggan, supra note 44, at 206 (arguing that mothers will generally concede that if 
forced between the move and her child, she would pick her child, and this runs the risk the judge 
will devalue her reasons for relocating or find her to be a selfish mother). 
 377. The preliminary hearing should be given higher priority on the court docket than any 
actions under MO. REV. STAT. § 452.300 et. seq., except adult abuse actions and child abuse 
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relocating parent would not be able to have both a trial and a ruling before the 
date the parent must relocate; and (2) if by not getting an affirmative ruling 
from the trial court before the slated move date, the parent’s move would 
become moot due to an imminent opportunity which could not be delayed.378 
At the preliminary hearing, the court should have the power to allow the 
custodial parent to relocate, pending final adjudication on the merits, if: 
(1) The relocating parent can prove the move is not made in bad faith and 
the move is made for certain bona fide reasons, such as remarriage, 
employment, educational opportunities, or natural disasters. 
(2) Or there is a substantial likelihood that the relocating parent would 
prevail at a full hearing; 
(3) Unless the non-relocating parent proves that a temporary move would 
endanger the health or welfare of the child. 
If a parent meets the criteria for a temporary relocation, the court should 
allow the parent to relocate, realizing, however, that the court has not yet 
adjudicated the relocation on its merits. Courts should be satisfied that, given 
the evidence before them, the move would likely be allowed if given a full 
hearing.  The ruling should not be taken lightly, given the drastic changes and 
costs it would impose upon the family if the child, who has already relocated 
and started adjusted to a new town and school, was forced to once again move.  
The move would also impose a great cost upon the parent who would not have 
decided to move, start a new job, buy a new house, etc., if she knew that the 
child would not be allowed to accompany her. 
This temporary mechanism realizes that, no matter how large of an 
evidentiary burden a non-custodial father may face in bearing the burden of 
showing that the move is not in the child’s best interest, some mothers may 
ultimately be prevented from moving by fathers’ stall tactics in preventing the 
case from getting an expedient trial.379  Unscrupulous parties could certainly 
request extensive discovery, request extensions for judicial deadlines, and 
delay the trial process as long as possible to pressure a custodial parent to 
 
complaints. This type of expedited hearing is already in place for Family Access orders, where 
parents who have been wrongly denied visitation with their children can seek immediate redress 
from the courts.  See Plax & Barrie, supra note 60, at 332 (discussing the expedited process for 
Family Access orders); see also PROPOSED MODEL RELOCATION ACT, supra note 375, § 402 
Comment (recognizing proposed relocations often involve time sensitive issues and should be 
afforded appropriate priority on a court’s docket). 
 378. This mechanism is based loosely off the temporary hearing procedures codified in 
PROPOSED MODEL RELOCATION ACT, supra note 375, § 401(b). 
 379. See supra notes 133–56, 174–75 and accompanying text. 
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abandon a time-sensitive move.380  At the same time, it would be unwise to 
force courts to make final decisions in all relocation cases on an expedited 
basis.381  In “close-call” relocation cases, where there is a potential for the 
relocation to harm the child, the judge should have the benefit of reviewing 
discovery and evidence, which might not otherwise be obtained if the court 
were forced to decide the case immediately, before each side could build much 
of a case.382  This mechanism creates a middle ground: allowing parents the 
flexibility to move quickly, while allowing judges the proper amount of time 
necessary to fully determine whether the move is in the child’s best interests. 
In reality, when a court allows a custodial parent to temporarily relocate 
pending final adjudication, many non-custodial parents may feel pressure to 
settle the case or withdraw their objections unless they truly felt that the move 
would be harmful to the child.  Consequently, this mechanism has an added 
bonus of discouraging non-custodial parents from pursuing or continuing with 
vexatious litigation. 
To safeguard the integrity of the preliminary hearing, courts should be 
allowed to sanction custodial parents who falsify or deliberately conceal 
material information regarding the relocation at the temporary hearing.383  In 
addition, courts should have the option to sanction non-relocating parents who 
make frivolous objections to legitimate relocation requests which increase the 
cost of litigation and unduly delay the proceedings.384 
1. Judicial Oversight 
One reform needed to improve the integrity of the family court system is 
implementing a system, though often overlooked, of oversight of the judicial 
process.  Family court judges have some of the most unfettered discretion of 
any judges in the judiciary.385  Because the standards in family law cases are so 
vague, judges are free to decide cases based on any number of personal 
biases.386  This is problematic for a variety of reasons.  First, it is simply 
arbitrary to allow one person, who is often overworked387 and under-informed 
 
 380. See supra notes 133–56, 174–75 and accompanying text discussing the inherent delays 
that many parents face in seeking to relocate.  When one party obstinately delays the relocation 
trial, the parent’s move could be prevented for even longer. 
 381. See Model Relocation Act, supra note 61, § 403 cmt. at 17 (“A full evidentiary hearing 
may be crucial to a relocation determination.”). 
 382. Id. 
 383. See id. § 409. 
 384. See id. (providing for sanctions for unwarranted or frivolous proposals to or objection to 
relocation of child). 
 385. See supra notes 285–356 and accompanying text (discussing biases). 
 386. See supra notes 185–210 (for vagueness), 285–356 (for biases) and accompanying text. 
 387. See Plax & Barrie, supra note 60, at 332 (recognizing that the family judges in some 
circuits face enormous caseloads). 
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of the familial situation388 and psychological research regarding the placement 
of children,389 to decide cases based on his or her gut instincts.390  Divorce and 
custody disputes occur at a time when the family is particularly vulnerable.  
The decisions that the judge makes often decide the whole course of a child’s 
life, create de facto decisions for parents on where to live and where to work, 
and can often exacerbate depression and conflict.391  Thus, the integrity of 
judicial interpretations of family law issues are “not only of basic human 
importance to the women, men, and children who seek to enforce their rights, 
but also critical to the public’s perception of the courts.”392  Missouri judges 
regard family law as “lower-status work,” and often, unfortunately, a judge’s 
distaste for the type of work is clear to many attorneys who appear before 
them.393 
Second, because the standards are vague and arbitrary, even when judges 
try diligently to decide the case objectively and evenhandedly, their rulings 
often contribute to a complete lack of consistency in the opinions of courts 
within the same state, region, or even judicial circuit.394  It is nonsensical that 
cases having almost identical facts can result in such different outcomes.  The 
problem is later compounded by appellate courts, which generally defer to the 
judgment of the trial court unless the judge has abused his or her discretion.  
What is left is a body of law that is virtually useless to any practitioner.395  As 
a Vermont judge succinctly put it: 
The lack of standards inhibits appellate review and does not provide the kind 
of predictability and stability that lawyers and litigants should expect from 
recent decisions.  Without guidelines, we will quickly produce a hodgepodge 
of decisions with no consistent thread other than “the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion.”  The reality of this kind of decision-making is that very similar 
cases will result in very different decisions, and a custodial parent’s ability to 
relocate will depend on the vicissitudes of individual judges.  Because of 
factual differences in cases, we will always be forced to tolerate some 
 
 388. See Duggan, supra note 44, at 196 (stating that judges always know less about what is 
best for a child than the child’s parents).  
 389. See Charlow, supra note 107, at 279 (arguing that although social and psychological 
research may reveal useful conclusions about the reality of child development in broken families, 
judges generally do not apply the research to their decisions). 
 390. See supra note 285 and text. 
 391. See Sheehan, supra note 176, at 135.  
 392. See Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 527. 
 393. Id. at 537 n.197 (survey of judges showing 68% believing family law was sometimes, 
usually, or always regarded as “lower status work”). Judges surveyed overwhelmingly chose 
juvenile and family law as the least desirable judicial assignment, but most judges had not 
received juvenile matters within the last five years. Id. at 537 n.198. 
 394. See supra notes 178–80, 185–90 and accompanying text. 
 395. See supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text. 
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inconsistency in decision-making, but we ought not create the circumstances in 
which it will flourish.396 
Further, the family court system lacks the transparency for scholars and 
critics to expediently “catch” the abuse of any particular judge or to ascertain 
troubling patterns of custody rulings across regions or circuits.  In Missouri, 
there is no “tracking system” where interested parties can review the decisions 
made by trial judges.  Family law cases, at the trial level, are not published on 
databases like Westlaw or Lexis where one can search by keyword or topic.  
Individual cases are docketed on the state’s case management system, but the 
system does not include any substantive information about the litigants and the 
dispute that would be helpful in gathering statistical information about court 
rulings.397  Even if the trial court’s ruling were successfully obtained, it would 
likely be unhelpful in understanding the basis for the court’s ruling.  Although 
courts are required to make findings of fact in child custody decisions, trial 
courts often do not do so.398  When the judges fail to make comprehensive 
findings of fact, it leaves the party interpreting the order to merely guess why 
the judge decided the way he did.  Therefore, the decision would be of limited 
use to a researcher.399 
This current lack of transparency and oversight can allow certain judges to 
consistently decide cases wrongfully—based on biases400 or perhaps just plain 
laziness401—with only the remote possibility of being caught and 
reprimanded.402  As one government worker put it: “If you’re working for the 
city and you dump a load of cement in the street, everybody can find out about 
 
 396. DeBeaumont v. Goodrich, 644 A.2d 843, 857–58 (Vt. 1994) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 397. See generally Missouri Case.net, https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
 398. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.6 (2000) (court order must include written findings 
detailing specific written factors); Schlotman v. Costa, 193 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) 
(written findings required in relocation cases).  But see id. at 433 (remanding case to trial court 
because it did not make written findings); Osia v. Osia, No. 05WA-CC00096-01 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 
24th Jud. Cir. Jul. 23, 2007), aff’d, 260 S.W.3d 438, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (court failed to 
make written findings and appellate court issued memorandum opinion affirming trial court); 
Pastis, supra note 45, at 425 (explaining that findings often are not made). 
 399. Files kept at local courthouses do not keep copies of exhibits or transcripts of the 
proceedings. The researcher is left to only know what the trial court has told her about the facts of 
the case, without the benefit of comparing the judge’s ruling with an actual record. 
 400. See supra notes 285–356 and accompanying text discussing judicial bias; see also Task 
Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 155, at 540 (one family law attorney testifies that because 
judges’ decisions are afforded much discretion on appeal, judges are more likely to follow their 
own “predilections or biases” rather than apply the law). 
 401. See Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 540 (stating that attorneys are 
often frustrated that family law judges do not keep abreast of new developments in the law and do 
not follow the law). 
 402. See supra notes 426–30 and accompanying text.  See infra notes 437–38 and 
accompanying text 
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it.  But if the same government messes up a child’s life, it’s secret, and that’s 
why people get away with it.”403  Although there are mechanisms to report 
judicial misconduct, in family law cases they are not likely to be utilized.404  In 
Missouri, once family law litigants have been assigned a judge, they generally 
are reassigned the same judge for every subsequent modification 
proceeding.405  Because of this, litigants are discouraged from reporting 
judicial misconduct, since they know that the judge will be assigned to any 
future modifications they seek.  Similarly, attorneys are not likely to report 
judicial misconduct either, since they often have to appear before the same 
judge, and do not want to risk angering the judge by reporting him or her for 
judicial misconduct.406  Since there are few checks and balances on the actions 
of judges, family law courts have sometimes been termed “kangaroo courts” 
because they offer little protection to litigants who are wronged.407 
I propose that the state should create a family court judicial oversight 
commission which audits trial court rulings.408  The auditor would randomly 
compare the outcome of factually similar cases throughout the state, and could 
report trends to state bar associations and the legislature.409  If the auditor 
finds, for example, that certain trial courts are making inconsistent rulings in 
similar factual scenarios, the auditor could suggest that either the courts or the 
 
 403. AMY NEUSTEIN & MICHAEL LESHER, FROM MADNESS TO MUTINY: WHY MOTHERS 
ARE RUNNING FROM FAMILY COURTS—AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 205 (2005) 
(criticizing the secrecy of family court rulings and noting that the results would likely cause 
public outrage if known). 
 404. For example, complaints can be made through the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.  
See Missouri Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, http://www.mochiefcounsel.org/index.htm 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2010).  There is also the option of voting out poor-quality judges. But this is 
not likely to be very helpful either.  In general, the voting public is unfamiliar with the demeanor 
and actions of judges well enough to be able to cast an informed vote.   
 405. MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.05(a); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.410.2 (2000). 
 406. Based on conversations the author has had with many family law attorneys. See also 
Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 539 (explaining that family law attorneys are 
often put in an “awkward position of repeatedly appearing before the judge on the case who, in 
turn, may not only find the assignment distasteful, but may be particularly impatient with a party 
who is regularly before the court.”).  But see MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 4-8.3(b) (2007) 
(“A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial 
conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge’s fitness for office shall inform the 
appropriate authority.”). 
 407. NEUSTEIN & LESHER, supra note 403, at 28. 
 408. The Missouri State Auditor is responsible for auditing courts for fiscal and budgetary 
matters. However, there is no indication  the Auditor, or any other authority, randomly reviews 
courts for substantive legal-related problems. See Missouri State Auditor’s Office, 
http://www.auditor.mo.gov/auditreports/courts.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2009). 
 409. See NEUSTEIN & LESHER, supra note 403, at 216–17 (recommending a special 
commission to review case decisions of sitting family court judges; recommending the 
commissions consist of judges, psychologists, and laypersons; and recommending the 
commission release annual reports).  
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legislature create procedural or substantive rules to guide trial court judges.  
Likewise, the auditors would be looking for individual biases from judges.  If a 
judge, for example, heard many relocation cases, and never allowed one—even 
in varying factual situations—the judge should likely be investigated for lack 
of impartiality.  In the same respect, if it is obvious that a particular judge has 
made clearly biased statements and issued discriminatory rulings to litigants, 
state disciplinary authorities should also investigate the judge.  This system 
would serve as an important check on the authority of judges, and provide a 
vital way to ensure that cases are being decided fairly and consistently across 
the state. 
2. Benefits 
As one judge has put it: 
The law pretends that we can determine with some high degree of predictive 
accuracy whether a move . . . will be in a child’s best interest—we can’t. The 
truth is this: there is no evidence that our decisions in these types of cases 
result in an outcome that is any better for the child than if the parents did rock-
paper-scissors.410 
Any custody trial is corrosive to a family, but in relocation disputes, the worst 
aspects of custody trials are multiplied.411 
Maintaining predictability and balance in trial judges’ rulings has been a 
widely recognized problem.412  At the same time, most commentators and 
judges have emphasized that all custody disputes are different.  This system 
would reduce the amount of relocation litigation and would expedite the 
process of time-sensitive relocation trials.  Such a system would discourage 
prolonged conflict between the parents and satisfy concerns about children’s 
sense of urgency and the need for continuity, while allowing the court to 
prevent relocations that would be detrimental to a child.413 
Requiring the non-custodial parent to bear the burden of proving that 
relocation is not in the best interest of the child is consistent with the principal 
that once a custodial parent has been deemed a fit caretaker, courts should not 
modify the custody arrangement unless a significant change in circumstances 
has occurred.  In today’s mobile society, most relocations simply should not 
qualify as a significant enough change to reverse custody.  Deferring to the 
 
 410. Duggan, supra note 44, at 193; See also Comment, Alternatives to “Parental Right” in 
Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 153–54 (1963) (arguing that 
the standard may disguise mere “judicial intuition”). 
 411. Duggan, supra note 44, at 194. 
 412. See Tracia, supra note 35, at 166 (discussing the problems with Massachusetts’ 
relocation law); Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 228 (N.J. 2001) (recognizing unpredictability and 
lack of guidance to trial judges in New Jersey’s old relocation statute). 
 413. See Charlow, supra note 107, at 284. 
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judgment of the custodial parent prevents “the vexation and expense [of 
defending] . . . unjustified lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters 
reliance on judicial actions by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent 
decisions.”414 
Allowing courts to micromanage the day-to-day decisions parents make 
about their careers and families may cause parents constant stress about how 
their decisions will be perceived by a detached judge and may change the way 
the parents make parenting decisions.  It also furthers the possibility that 
parents will be exposed to unnecessary litigation simply because they seek to 
move.415  In corporate law, courts use the “business judgment rule” to presume 
that corporate directors are acting in the best interests of their corporation and 
the court will only scrutinize directors’ decisions if they have violated a duty of 
care.  In effect, the courts have recognized that the directors, not judges, know 
more about what is necessary to run a successful business and courts are loathe 
to second guess the business decisions of corporate directors.  In family law, 
the same holds true for the decisions of intact parents.416  When parents are 
divorced or unmarried, however, Missouri courts apparently no longer assume 
that parents are capable of keeping the child’s best interests in mind, and 
instead force judges, rather than the parents, to make major decisions regarding 
the child.  In these situations, courts should apply what I call the “family 
judgment rule” to presume that the decisions made by a custodial parent are 
made with the family’s best interest in mind unless the custodial parent is 
clearly acting in bad faith or in a way that is likely to endanger a child.  Since 
mothers generally bear the brunt of a child’s day-to-day care, requiring fathers 
 
 414. Cocus, supra note 44, at 111. 
 415. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 481 (Cal. 1996)) (explaining that 
pressuring parents to not relocate would undermine the court’s interest “in minimizing costly 
litigation over custody and require the trial courts to “micromanage” family decision-making by 
second-guessing reasons for everyday decisions about career and family.”). 
 416. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979). 
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as 
a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently 
followed that course. . . . The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that 
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment 
required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has 
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their 
children.  … That some parents “may at times be acting against the interests of their 
children” . . .   creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those 
pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best 
interests. . . . The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental 
authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to 
American tradition. . . .  Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child 
or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that 
decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
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to show that relocation would harm the child maintains the continuity of care 
the child has with its primary caretaker, the mother, while allowing the court 
the flexibility to prevent bad faith and detrimental relocations.417  Changing the 
burden of proof is not enough to protect the interests of the custodial parent 
and the child.418  Just as shareholders are discouraged from suing corporations 
if they know they will be met with the business judgment rule, in family law, 
the non-custodial parent, facing a heavy burden, would also be less likely to 
pursue litigation unless he or she truly believed that preventing relocation 
would be in the best interests of the child.419  But in relocation cases, there is 
often an added wrinkle: time-sensitivity.  The litigation process is slow, and 
significant delays in relocation can prevent parents from obtaining a job or an 
educational opportunity that served as the basis of their relocation requests.  
Unscrupulous non-custodial parents may, for that very reason, contest 
relocations for frivolous reasons, even if they are “unqualified for or 
uninterested in obtaining custody.”420  For this reason, there must be a 
procedure in place to ensure that parents faced with time-sensitive relocations 
can seek expedited hearings. 
Loving parents should not be treated like criminals, shackled to their past 
homes and communities merely because they want to build a better life for 
themselves and their children.421  To be sure, “an award of custody to a parent 
should [not] be interpreted as a sentence to immobilization.”422  As other 
authors have noted, denying a mother the right to relocate with her children is, 
in many ways, putting her under house arrest.423  And for all the social costs 
that the law imposes upon a mother and her new family unit, the relocation law 
cannot even meet its implied purpose of “simulating unity.”  In sum, 
A rule of law that effectively requires custodial parents to gamble custody of 
the children before they can live with their children and new spouses . . . while 
imposing no similar limitations on noncustodial parents who profess to be 
“highly involved” in the lives of their children—seems the very antithesis of 
domestic stability. It is also grossly unfair.424 
 
 417. Sheehan, supra note 176, at 148; see generally Bruch, supra note 34, 281–94. 
 418. Contra Cocus, supra note 46, at 103 (“[A]ll that is needed is a simple shift in the burden 
of proof.”).  
 419. Id. at 111. 
 420. Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 39, at 248. 
 421. “Our precedent has essentially placed custodial parents in the untenable position of being 
prisoners in the state . . . .” Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 864 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2002) (Bird, S., concurring). 
 422. Gottschall v. Gottschall, 316 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Neb. 1982); In re Marriage of Dusing, 
654 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (“Provisions for a relationship with both parents can 
be made other than by confining the wife’s residence to Butler County.”). 
 423. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 94. 
 424. Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d at 873.  
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CONCLUSION 
About every ten years, most states dramatically reverse the course that they 
have taken in relocation disputes.425  Missouri’s current relocation statute was 
implemented in 1998.426  For the last twelve years, Missouri has developed a 
body of relocation law that establishes no clear guidelines and makes it 
tremendously difficult for custodial parents to move with their children.  
Missouri’s time has come: it is time to break free from an outdated system that 
confines women to the immediate geographical area of their ex-lovers, and 
move toward a system that recognizes the realities of today’s modern mobile 
society.  When a relationship ends, by definition, things cannot stay the same 
and adults should realize the access to their children will necessarily change.  It 
is unrealistic and naïve for courts or former partners to assume that separated 
parents will continue to live in the same area indefinitely.  Regardless of life 
changes, a custodial parent, found by the court to be a suitable caretaker, is no 
less capable of being a responsible parent merely because he or she has 
requested to relocate.  Courts should not penalize mothers for seeking to 
improve their lives by relocating.  This  proposal for change seeks to protect 
mothers’ right to relocate, while preserving a father’s relationship with his 
children, and once implemented, would bring consistency, fairness, and 
judicial oversight to relocation decisions.  Although, as Balzac once stated, 
“Maternal love makes of every woman a slave,”427 it is time for Missouri to 
unlock the shackles that restrain women to the vicinity of their former partners 
and allow mothers the opportunity to pursue their goals and dreams. 
JULIE HIXSON-LAMBSON* 
  
 
 425. PHILIP M. STAHL & LESLIE M. DROZD, RELOCATION ISSUES IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES 
4 (2006). 
 426. Plax & Barrie, supra note 60, at 328. 
 427. CRITTENDEN, supra note 333, at 8. 
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Child Relocation Decision-Making Tool 
 
Initial Presumptions: 
1. International Moves. This test is not intended to be used when the 
contemplated move is an international move. International moves incorporate three 
potential concerns that are not at issue in domestic relations: the problem of 
retaining jurisdiction of the child and that the custody order will be honored; the 
problem of fashioning a reasonable visitation schedule when the distance is so 
great; and the problem that the cultural conditions of the country may put the child 
at risk.  See generally Lawrence Katz, When the Question Involved An 
International Move: The Answer May Lie in Retaining U.S. Jurisdiction, 28 SPG 
Fam. Advoc. 40 (2006).  Courts should devise their own standards for evaluating 
international relocation cases. 
2. Domestic Violence / Restricted Custody. This test is not intended to be used 
when the non-custodial parent has supervised visitation privileges, or has 
committed violence against the custodial parent or the child. It should presumably 
never be in the child’s interest to change custody to the non-custodial parent under 
these circumstances.  See generally Janet M. Bowermaster, Relocation Custody 
Disputes Involving Domestic Violence, 46 U. Kan. L. Rev. 433 (1998). 
Instructions: 
Fill out the following form as directed.  Consult the interpretive notes and 
comments to clarify each factor. 
 
Step 1: Motive of Custodial Parent’s Move 
 
I believe the custodial parent has a  
 □ good faith 
 □ bad faith reason for seeking to relocate. 
That reason is: 
 
 
 If the reason is a good faith reason, go to Step 2. 
 If the reason is a bad faith reason, this analysis is over and the 
relocation should be presumptively denied. 
Enter reason here. 
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Step 2: Best Interest of the Child Factors 
 
 
1. The non-custodial parent has been actively involved in the child/children’s 
life.1 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
 
2. The non-custodial parent has been responsible in financially supporting 
the child/children.2 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
 
3. If relocation is allowed, the court can fashion an alternative visitation 
schedule which will promote and foster the non-relocating parent’s 
relationship with the child/children.3 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
 
4. The non-custodial parent has the ability to relocate with the child/children 
to the new town.4 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
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5. If allowed to move, the relocating parent will likely cooperate to comply 
with the newly fashioned visitation order.5 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
 
6. The non-custodial parent’s motives in resisting the relocation are based on 
improper motives.6 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
 
7. The move will have substantial benefits to the custodial parent.7 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
 
 List the benefits: 
 
 
8. The relocation will likely enhance the quality of life of the child/children.8 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
 
 List the benefits: 
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9. The parties can afford the transportation costs associated with the 
relocation, taking into account alternative ways of allocating 
transportation expenses.9 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
 
10. The child has expressed a preference in remaining with the custodial 
parent and/or relocating with the custodial parent, if the child is of 
sufficient age and maturity to express a preference.10 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
 
11. The move will allow the child to maintain their relationships with other 
close family members such as siblings, grandparents, aunts/uncles, and 
cousins.11 
 strongly disagree How Important is this Factor?  very important 
 disagree  somewhat important 
 neutral  neutral 
 agree  not important 
 strongly agree  not applicable 
The relocation “best interest” score is: _____. 
The relocation: 
□ is likely in the best interests of the child 
□ may or may not be in the best interests of the child 
□ is likely not in the best interests of the child 
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Step 3: The Least Detrimental Alternative 
 
If the relocation is presumptively not in the best interests of the child, would it be 
more detrimental to the child to change custody than it would be for the child to 
relocate with the custodial parent? 
□ more detrimental to change custody 
□ more detrimental to relocate with custodial parent 
List Reasons Why: 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 4: Should the Presumptions Be Rebutted 
 
Should the presumption that the relocation is in the best interests of the child be 
rebutted? 
□ yes 
□ no 
If no, the inquiry is over and the relocation should be granted. 
If yes, is: 
□ the calculation unjust or improper because it does not 
 adequately reflect the best interests of the child 
□ the move is likely to endanger the health or welfare of 
 the child 
If the presumption is rebutted, findings of fact and conclusions of law must be 
made regarding why the presumption should be rebutted. 
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COMMENTS AND INTERPRETIVE NOTES: 
1. If the non-custodial parent has not been actively involved in the child’s 
life, the court should typically allow the custodial parent to move rather than 
considering transferring custody to the non-custodial parent.  This includes 
non-custodial parents who have been granted extensive custody time and failed 
to exercise it, or non-custodial parents who have shown little or no interest in 
pursuing extensive custody time with the child.  This also would include non-
custodial parents whose history of exercising custody of the child is sporadic 
(i.e., the parent may be highly involved in the child’s life for two months and 
then disappear for five months).  The court should also consider if the non-
custodial parent only started to be actively involved in the child’s life after 
being notified of the custodial parent’s prospective relocation. 
 This assumption ensures that the parent who has been actively 
involved in the child’s life will be able to remain with the child.  This 
assumption also prevents non-involved parents from forcing the other 
parent into settlement concessions—such as the payment of less child 
support in return for the parent being able to move.  It also prevents 
non-custodial parents who seek to “control” of the mother and the 
child, rather than maintaining a parental relationship with the child, is 
not allowed to veto a move by the parent who is cultivating a parental 
relationship.  It also follows the psychological research that “Non-
resident fathers who are not highly motivated to enact the parental role 
or who lack the skills to be effective parents are unlikely to benefit 
their children, even under conditions of regular visitation.”  Amato & 
Gilbreth, supra note 88, at 569. 
 See Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(considering the father’s distant relationship and his sporadic and 
inconsistent visitation as a factor weighing against him); Proposed 
Model Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers 1997) (taking into consideration the “nature, quality, extent 
of involvement and duration of the relationship of the child with each 
parent”); Richards, supra note 55, at 283; Valdespino, supra 99, at 22. 
2. If the non-custodial parent has a history of being delinquent in, or 
altogether failing to pay court ordered child support or other child related 
expenses (i.e., medical bills), because of either financial burdens or ideological 
reasons, the court should typically allow the custodial parent to move rather 
than considering transferring custody to the non-custodial parent. 
 The reality is that it generally costs more to raise a child than a parent 
is receiving in child support payments.  If a parent cannot afford to 
make timely child support payments, a court should assume that they 
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also would have the financial inability to pay for the normal household 
expenses of the child.  Likewise, if the non-custodial parent is either 
neglecting his court ordered support duty or willfully avoiding the 
obligation, the court should be concerned about transferring custody to 
the parent since the parent has shown disrespect for the authority of 
the court and a disregard for child’s well being. 
 See, e.g., Richards, supra note 55, at 267 & n.122; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9:355.12(9) (Supp. 2007). 
3. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:355.12(3) (Supp. 2007) (“The feasibility of 
preserving a good relationship between the nonrelocating parent and the child 
through suitable visitation arrangements . . .”).  See Proposed Model 
Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1997); 
Richards, supra note 55, at 283; Valdespino, supra note 99, at 22–23; “A 
reasonable schedule of visitation is one that provides a satisfactory basis for 
preserving and fostering a child’s relationship with the non-custodial parent” 
even if it reduces the total number of visitation days. Farnsworth v. 
Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Neb. 1999). 
4. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:355.12(10) (Supp. 2007). 
5. Proposed Model Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers 1997); Richards, Proposed Model Relocation Statute, 
supra note, at 283. A parent’s past behavior of denying visitation may show an 
unwillingness to cooperate with a court plan if they move outside the 
jurisdiction.  But a parent’s willingness to offer the other parent a generous 
visitation plan, offer alternative ways for the non-custodial parent to keep in 
touch with the child, such as virtual communication, telephone calls, and drop-
in visits, the parent’s motives in seeking to relocate are likely pure and the 
parent will mostly likely cooperate to make sure the non-custodial parent is 
given the opportunity to be involved in the child’s life, despite the relocation.  
But if a judge foresees problems with a parent failing to comply with the 
custody order after the relocation, requiring the parent to post a bond to secure 
compliance may alleviate concerns that the custodial parent will frustrate the 
other parent’s visitation rights.  See Valdespino, supra note 99, at 24.  See also 
Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (considering 
the mother’s willingness to allow frequent and meaningful contact with the 
father as a factor weighing in favor of the move). 
6. Sometimes a non-custodial parent’s reason for opposing the litigation is 
for an improper motive, such as using his power to delay the relocation as a 
tactic to reduce his child support. See Ford, supra note 69, at 11; Richards, 
supra note 55, at 267.  In other cases, a non-custodial parent may oppose the 
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move as a way of seeking to exert control over his ex-wife. See Ford, supra 
note 69, at 11; Richards, supra note 55, at 267. 
 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:355.12(7) (Supp. 2007); Proposed Model 
Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 
1997); Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 319–21. 
7. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:355.12(6) (Supp. 2007); Proposed Model 
Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1997) 
(“Whether the relocation of the child will enhance the general quality of life 
for both the custodial parent seeking the relocation and the child, including but 
not limited to financial or emotional benefit and educational opportunity.”). 
See Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(considering the mother’s option of being able to work from home and spend 
more time with the children if allowed to move as a factor weighing in favor of 
relocation); Abernathy v. Meier, 45 S.W.3d 917, 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (the 
custodial parent’s economic, emotional, and physical well-being are important 
factors to consider); Valdespino, supra note 99, at 23–24.  Some of the benefits 
could include an increase in the parent’s income, better employment 
opportunity for the parent, better housing conditions, educational 
improvement, closer access to a support system such as family relatives.  See 
Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d 592 (Neb. 1999). 
8. See, e.g., Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(considering the community, school, and recreational benefits to the children 
as a factor weighing in favor of the move); Proposed Model Relocation Act, 
supra note 375, § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1997); 
Richards, supra note 55, at 283; Valdespino, supra note 99, at 23–24. 
9. See Valdespino, supra note 99, at 23. 
10. See Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(considering the children’s desire to remain with their mother as a factor 
weighing in favor of the move); Becker v. Becker, 745 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. App. 
1987) (changing custody from mother to father where mother moved to take 
new job and teenage children preferred to live with father since they had 
friends, relatives, and school-related events they enjoyed in the area); Proposed 
Model Relocation Act, supra note 375, § 405; Richards, supra note 55, at 123, 
283; Valdespino, supra note 99, at 23; Pfenning, supra note 180, at 129; 
Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 323; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 208, § 
30 (child over age fourteen must consent to relocation or court must grant 
permission upon good cause); Emery et al. supra note 285. See generally Gary 
A. Debele, A Children’s Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best 
Interests Standard, 10 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law 75 (1998). But cf. Ford, 
supra note 69, at 52 (arguing that if parents in intact families can make moves 
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affecting their children without judicial intervention, then the court should 
value the custodial parent’s decision to move over the child’s desire to stay). 
11. See Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(considering the children’s close relationship with other household members, 
including their half-brother and mother’s new husband, as a factor weighing in 
favor of the move). 
  After assessing whether a relocating parent’s move is made in good 
faith, and attempting to assess the best interest factors, a judge may 
rebut the form if relocation would endanger a child’s mental, 
emotional, or physical health. 
o  Endangering a child’s mental, emotional, or physical health is 
more than just the trauma that would be associated with any move.  
This factor is likely met if the child has a very strong relationship 
with the non-custodial parent and relocation would severely strain 
that relationship.  See Ford, supra note 69, at 47–49 (discussing 
Kentucky’s endangerment standard); see also Wallerstein & Tanke, 
supra note 38, at 319 (supporting the idea that court’s should protect 
a child’s most important relationship, and sometimes that 
relationship may be with the non-custodial parent); Richards, supra 
note 55, at 263–64 (noting that sometimes the non-custodial parent 
is the primary “psychological parent” and separating the child from 
that parent may be detrimental).  It may also occur if the relocation 
is a considerable distance away and the child is of an age that would 
effectively prevent the non-custodial parent from maintaining 
visitation with the child for a long span of time (until the child 
reaches an age where long periods of visitation time would be 
appropriate), and there are not other compelling reasons why the 
relocation should be granted. It may also occur if the relocating 
parent has bona fide reasons for a move, but the child has a health 
condition that necessitates stability or close proximity to certain 
medical facilities. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.340(3)(a),(b),(c) 
(instructing that relocation should be denied if it would 
fundamentally alter the relationship between the child and the non-
custodial parent in a way that would threaten mental or emotional 
harm to the child—because the cumulative benefits of changing 
custody from the custodial parent to the non-custodial parent would 
outweigh the harm caused); Richards, supra note 55, at 265, 282; 
Terry, supra note 84, at 184 (giving examples of situations where 
relocation could jeopardize the well-being of the child, including (1) 
relocating a child with a serious medical condition to an area where 
adequate treatment is unavailable; (2) relocating a child with special 
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needs to an area without adequate educational opportunities tailored 
to the child’s needs; or (3) relocating to a residence of a confirmed 
child abuser). 
  Example 1: Mother A, the primary parent, seeks to relocate 
from Texas to Michigan with her three-month-old child. The 
parent’s marriage ended shortly before the child was born.  Father 
loves the child, and visits the child as much as he can, but the 
child does not spend overnights with the father due to the child’s 
young age.  Mother’s reason for relocating from Texas to 
Michigan is because she has found a job there that has the same 
hour requirements, but pays $1.50 more per hour. Other than this 
job, there are no other compelling reasons for the relocation.  
There is no reason to believe the father would not be an adequate 
caretaker.  The court should not grant the relocation, and should 
grant custody to father if mother chooses to relocate.  If mother 
stays, she may retain primary custody of the child.  Obviously 
neither choice is optimal—if the mother moved to New York, 
there is virtually no way to fashion a visitation agreement where 
the child could have a relationship with the father for at least 
several years, due to the child’s young age and the great distance.  
Nor is it optimal for the child to suddenly live apart from its 
primary caretaker to live with a parent who has had little 
opportunity to attach with the child.  The court should force the 
mother to make the Sophie’s choice of choosing to stay and retain 
custody of the child, or to relocate and change custody to the 
child’s father.  While, depending on other facts, this relocation 
may have been allowed if the child were a few years older and 
could tolerate extended periods of visitation, or if the mother had 
a very compelling reason for the move—despite the disadvantages 
to the father, it should be discouraged in this context because of 
the limited benefits of the move and the severe consequences of 
totally cutting off a relationship with the father for several years. 
  Example 2: Mother B, the primary parent, seeks to relocate 
200 miles away to pursue a career advancement opportunity that 
would give her a promotion and a raise.  Mother and Father have 
both been involved in the child’s life, and there is no reason to 
believe that the father would not be an adequate caretaker for the 
child.  Child has autism and there is compelling evidence that 
even minor changes in the child’s life causes the child severe 
anguish and causes the child to regress.  In other words, the child 
has a medical need for stability.  Certainly, it would not be in the 
child’s best interest to relocate. Nor would it be in the child’s best 
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interest for the court to change custody to father—this too would 
exacerbate the child’s medical condition.  This is a prime example 
of a situation where a court should seek to discourage the 
relocation.  The court should force the mother to make the 
Sophie’s choice.  The court should not allow the relocation, and 
threaten to change custody to father if the mother chooses to 
move.  If the mother chooses to stay, she may retain primary 
custodian of the child.  If she chooses to relocate anyway, despite 
the convincing evidence that her child will be severely harmed, 
the court has probably made the right decision to change custody 
to the father, even if it is not the optimal choice.  The mother’s 
decision to move to the severe detriment of the child would 
indicate that she does not sincerely act in the child’s best interests. 
  Example 3: Child C is 8 years old and has a rare genetic 
disorder that requires her to undergo frequent hospital stays, and 
requires the expertise of highly specialized doctors. Mother C, and 
Father C divorced when the child was 3.  Mother C has primary 
physical custody, and Father C has visitation every other 
weekend, extended summer visitation, and visitation over certain 
holidays.  There is no reason to believe father would not be an 
adequate caretaker of the child.  Mother C remarried a year after 
her divorce, and her and Stepfather C have two children of their 
own from this marriage—Child C’s half-siblings.  Stepfather C’s 
mother is elderly and has lived alone, but has recently been 
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s and can no longer live alone and care 
for herself. Stepfather C seeks to relocate with his wife and 
children to the town where his mother lives—a rural area.  The 
town is 45 miles from the nearest hospital and that hospital lacks 
the medical equipment and specialized doctors needed to assist 
with Child C’s condition.  Although this situation is tough, 
Mother C has a very compelling reason to move, the court should 
discourage the move and force her to make a Sophie’s Choice.  If 
she stays, she can retain primary custody of Child C, but if she 
relocates Father C will be awarded primary physical custody.  
Although it is likely not optimal for Child C to change primary 
caregivers, her very specific health conditions necessitate her 
staying within close proximity to the specialized medical facilities 
she needs.  Although this situation is arguably one of the most 
difficult ones, the court should discourage the move.  See 
Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 863 (Ark. 2002) 
(Pittman, J. concurring) (“[I]n the case of a child suffering from a 
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serious medical condition, ready access to appropriate health care 
facilities may be an overriding concern.”). 
 Situations where the best interest factors would necessitate 
changing custody to father, but moving with the mother would not 
“endanger” the child’s welfare. 
o  Example 1: Mother D and Father D divorced when child 
was 12.  They both are adequate and competent parents. Both 
parents have been highly involved in the child’s life and the 
child has a strong connection to them both.  Both parents live 
in the same town and in the same public school district.  Child 
D is now 16 and has just started her senior year of high 
school, where she has attended her whole life. Child D is 
academically advanced, is taking AP courses, and is highly 
involved in sports and other extracurricular activities.  Mother 
D’s employer has merged with another company and is 
eliminating her position her geographic market.  They have, 
however, offered Mother D an opportunity to take a position 
in another metropolitan area 300 miles away.  The position 
raises Mother D two levels and almost doubles her salary. In 
order to take this position, mother must move immediately 
and cannot postpone the move. If she does not take the 
opportunity, she will lose her job.  Going through the court’s 
analysis, the mother obviously has a good faith reason for the 
move.  In step two, the court analyzes the best interest factors 
and finds that given the child’s age, the distance of the move, 
the child’s close relationship with both parents, and the 
child’s significant interest in finishing her last year of high 
school in the school she has attended her whole life, the court 
decides the relocation is not in the best interests of the child.  
Going to step 3, although Child D would not be “endangered” 
by moving with her mother, the move would be very 
traumatic her for.  Although Child D could arguably adjust to 
the move, and although her mother is an adequate caretaker, 
the court should probably find that the detriment of the move 
is not outweighed by the benefit of remaining with her 
primary caretaker.  The court should transfer custody to the 
father if the mother moves.  By remaining with father, she 
would be able to complete her last year of high school 
without interruption. 
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